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While sports have long played an important role in educating boys and
young men in leadership, physical fitness and competitive skills, only recent-
ly have girls and young women had the chance to benefit from athletic
opportunities. Over two decades of experience with a federal statute pro-
hibiting sex discrimination in school sports programs have brought important
successes in opening doors for female athletes. However, enforcement of
equal opportunity in this area has encountered strong resistance from the
athletic establishment, which has fought efforts to equalize resources and
opportunities for young women.
Heightened enforcement of equal athletic opportunity in the 1990s has
rekindled old opposition to basic notions of gender fairness in sports. React-
ing to the recent successes of female athletes in the courts, both college foot-
ball and other men's sports advocates have taken the offensive in challeng-
ing the law's requirements, arguing -that men are more interested in sports
than women and therefore deserve the lion's share of resources and opportu-
nities. While such challenges have not succeeded, future progress toward
gender equity in sports requires a renewed commitment to the underlying
principle that female athletes are as deserving of sports opportunities as their
male counterparts.
This Article discusses the recent backlash against the legal requirements
governing sex discrimination in intercollegiate athletic programs in the con-
text of the history and enforcement of the law. Part I discusses the require-
ments of the law, its legislative and interpretive history, and recent advances
in enforcement. Part II discusses the recent backlash against the law and
debunks the myths underlying the arguments relied upon by those opposing
further steps toward legal enforcement. Part II also examines the treatment
of these arguments by the courts. Part III concludes with a brief discussion
of the value judgments underlying the backlash against gender equity in
sports.
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the Second Circuit. Catlin wrote this Article while a Georgetown Women's Law and Public
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19721 is the federal law pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs, including
sports programs, by any school receiving federal financial assistance. Title IX
has been the primary vehicle for asserting the right of women and girls to
equal opportunity in high school and college athletics, and has played a vital
role in opening competitive sports to female athletes over the last twenty-
four years.
A. Women's Sports Before Title IX
For many young women, it is difficult to believe that our nation's high
schools and colleges have not always provided athletic opportunities to their
female students. After all, these young women have grown up with fully
developed female sports programs in their schools and can see women and
girls playing competitive sports in unprecedented numbers. In 1994, there
were over 2.12 million female high school athletes and over 105,000 female
college athletes.' The inclusion of sports in the education of young women
is currently so normal that it is hard to imagine a different scenario.
The history of women's participation in competitive athletics is remark-
ably brief, however. As in many other arenas, society's beliefs about appro-
priate pursuits for women severely restricted women's participation in sports
before the 1970's. The public and aggressive nature of athletic competition
made it difficult to reconcile women's participation with the common percep-
tions of women as delicate, private, and passive creatures. Furthermore, and
somewhat ironic given what we now know about the benefits of regular
exercise, women were deemed too weak and fragile for competitive sports.3
Of particular concern was the possibility of injury to reproductive functions
of women participants, which reflected a larger preoccupation with the
threat of athletics to women's femininity. Because competitive sports were
such an exclusively male bastion, women who played them were perceived
as something less than female - women trying to be men, men-haters, or
lesbians.
As a result of these societal impediments, the opportunities for women
to play high school and college sports were limited. Before the passage of
Title IX in 1972, only 32,000 women per year played college sports.4 Athletic
scholarships for women were virtually non-existent, and many colleges had
no women's sports program at all.' At the high school level, fewer than
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). The text of Title IX is as follows: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
2. National College Athletic Ass'n, College Sports Participation Up for Women, Men Feb. 15,
1995 (news release) (on file with the National Women's Law Center) [hereinafter NCAA News
Release].
3. See Wendy Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda for Women and Sports in the
1990's, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105, 109-11 (1991).
4. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (1979).
5. See UNITED STATES COMM'N. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUB. No. 63, MoRE HURDLES TO CLEAR:
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300,000 girls competed in sports each year, representing only 7% of inter-
scholastic athletes nationwide. Girls who did play sports in high school re-
ceived dramatically different treatment in equipment, coaching, practice
times, and sports offerings.6
These numbers illustrate a degree of explicit discrimination against the
female athlete that, for the most part, is currently difficult to imagine. While
most interscholastic and intercollegiate sports programs today still have far
to go in achieving gender equity, they have come a long way in the past
two decades. Prior to Title IX's enactment, high schools and colleges simply
ignored the athletic potential of their female students entirely, or supplied
them with extremely limited programs that offered young female athletes
little chance to develop. Girls could not look to older women for inspiration
as they too had been continually denied access to meaningful athletic partici-
pation. The same social pressures that had kept women out of boardrooms
and courtrooms throughout the history of our country had also kept them
off the nation's playing fields.
B. Title IX's Legal History
1. Enactment of Title IX and the Emergence of Athletics as a Point of Con-
troversy. Title IX was passed in 1972 as a response to overwhelming evi-
dence of widespread discrimination against women at all levels of educa-
tion.7 The language of Title IX, which provides that "No person in the Unit-
ed States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... ,"' is modelled
on the prohibitions against race and national origin discrimination contained
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 Although Title IX was originally
proposed as an amendment to Title VI that would have added the word
"sex" to its prohibited forms of discrimination," the prevalence of discrimi-
nation in education resulted in a more narrowly tailored bill specifically
aimed at educational programs.
While Title IX itself does not mention athletics, the issue of discrimina-
WOMEN AND GIRLS IN COMPETITIVE ATHLETICS (1980) (describing the absence of athletic programs
for women and the lack of opportunities for female athletes historically).
6. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 25,508 (1971) (statement of Rep. Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.))
(noting that in many physical education classes, boys get to play more frequently, play with
more formal rules, and play on marked fields).
7. Representative Edith Green (D-Or.) held hearings on sex discrimination in the summer
of 1970 that were to serve as the foundation of the Title IX legislation. See Discrimination
Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16,098 Before the Special Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Referring to the hearings, Senator
Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), sponsor of the Title IX bill, noted "[o]ver 1,200 pages of testimony docu-
ment the massive, persistent patterns of discrimination in the academic world." 118 CONG.
REc. 5804 (1972).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal assistance.").
10. ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX 7 (1994).
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tion against women in sports programs was briefly addressed in the original
debates on the legislation," reflecting an expectation that athletics would be
covered. Soon after Title IX was enacted, prompted by strenuous lobbying
by the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) which feared that
Title IX signalled the demise of men's sports programs, several bills and
amendments were introduced in Congress in an effort to exempt revenue-
producing sports from coverage under Title IX.12 The debates that ensued
over these efforts to limit the application of Title IX, as well as their subse-
quent defeat, reinforced the intent of Congress to end discrimination in col-
lege and high school sports.
In May of 1974, Senator John Tower (R-Tex.) made the first strike
against Title IX in what became known as the Tower Amendment."3
Through this amendment, Senator Tower sought first to exempt all intercol-
legiate athletics, but then modified his amendment to exempt "intercollegiate
athletic activity to the extent that such activity does or may provide gross
receipts or donations to the institution necessary to support that activity." 4
His basic argument was that sports such as football provided a crucial reve-
nue base for the entire athletic program of many schools, and that any inter-
ference with these teams in the name of gender equity would spell disaster
for both the male athletes already playing and the female athletes who were
seeking a chance to play."5 Senator Bayh, sponsor of the Title IX legislation,
argued vociferously against the Tower Amendment, pointing out that it
inappropriately "focused on the ability of certain intercollegiate sports to
withstand the financial burdens imposed by the equal opportunity require-
ments of Title IX" rather than on discrimination against women. 6 Neverthe-
less, arguments in favor of the amendment prevailed and the Tower Amend-
ment was passed by the Senate.
When the Tower Amendment reached the conference committee on the
Education Amendments of 1974, however, it was deleted in favor of a far
different provision requiring the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW) to promulgate interpretive regulations. 7 This new provision,
now known as the Javits Amendment, named after Senator Jacob Javits (R-
N.Y.), instructed the Secretary of HEW to prepare regulations for implement-
ing Title IX that included "with respect to intercollegiate athletics reasonable
provisions considering the nature of particular sports."" This language con-
firmed that Congress intended Title IX to apply to athletic programs and
11. Senator Bayh mentioned athletics only twice - once to say that Title IX would not
mandate the desegregation of football, 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971), and once to state that
personal privacy in sports facilities should be maintained, 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972).
12. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
13. 120 CONG. REc. 15,322-23 (1974) (statement of Sen. John Tower).
14. S. 1539, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 536 (1974).
15. Id.
16. Prohibition of Sex Discrimination: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Education of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-47 (1975) [hereinafter Sex Discrimi-
nation Hearings].
17. See S. REP. No. 1026, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4271.
18. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974).
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acknowledged that certain sports may require greater expenditures to pro-
vide the same quality of competitive opportunities. The Javits Amendment
became law in 1974, and remains controlling today.' 9
Several other attempts to limit Title IX's coverage were made after the
Javits Amendment, but all were defeated.2' The continued resistance of
Congress during the mid-1970's to restrict Title IX's protections provided
further evidence of its commitment to end discrimination against women in
college and high school athletic programs.
2. Issuance and Adoption of Title IX's Regulations. HEW issued its pro-
posed Title IX regulations in June of 1974, followed by a lengthy period for
public comment that produced almost 10,000 responses.2' The proposed reg-
ulations included a requirement that institutions make affirmative efforts to
accommodate the interests and abilities of women athletes - an indication
of HEW's strong commitment to carrying out the objectives of Title IX'
Unfortunately, this requirement was dropped in response to pressure from
the NCAA and others who feared the impact of Title IX on men's athletic
programs.23
HEW issued final regulations early in the summer of 1975, incorporat-
ing many of the suggestions received during the comment period.24 Shortly
thereafter, Congress held extensive hearings on the issue of the athletic regu-
lations that included testimony from the sponsors of Title IX and many
others who offered evidence of the pervasive discrimination against women
in intercollegiate athletics and competitive sports generally.' One of the
more egregious examples cited was Ohio State University, which spent 1,300
times more money on its male athletes than on its female athletes.26 The
hearings established an extensive record of the nature and degree of discrim-
19. Id.
20. For example, Representative James O'Hara (D-Mich.) introduced a bill which would
have protected revenues produced by a team from use by any other team unless the first
team did not need the funds for itself. H.R. 8394, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Additionally,
Senator Tower, joined by Senators Dewey Bartlett (R-Okla.) and Roman Hruska (R-Neb.), tried
again in 1975 to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title IX. See S. 2106, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
21. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 436-42 (1975) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (testimony of Casper Weinberger, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW)). While not all of these comments focused on sports, the number of responses
on discrimination in intercollegiate athletics caused HEW Secretary Weinberger to testify be-
fore a House committee that "the most important issue in the United States today is intercol-
legiate athletics, because we have an enormous volume of comments about them." Id. at 439.
22. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,230, 22,230 (1974). "Affirmative efforts" were defined as both inform-
ing women of their participation opportunities and providing them with training and support,
as well as assessing the interest of each sex in various sports. Id.
23. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134, 24,134 (1975); see also Christina Johnson, The Evolution of Title
IX: Prospects for Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 759, 776 (1981).
24. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128, 24,128 (1975).
25. Sex Discrimination Hearings, supra note 16.
26. Sex Discrimination Hearings, supra note 16, at 197 (testimony of Rep. Stewart McKinney
(R-Conn.)).
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ination that women faced when seeking athletic opportunities.
After HEW issued the final regulations, Congress had forty-five days to
disapprove them by concurrent resolution. During this period, bills were
introduced seeking both disapproval of the regulations in their entirety
27
and as they applied to athletics specifically.28 The impetus behind these
bills was the continued lobbying of the NCAA, football interests, and those
who feared that giving women equal opportunities would work too great a
change on the athletic system that men had traditionally enjoyed as theirs
alone. Recognizing that this was their last chance to formally derail Title IX
as a vehicle for equal athletic opportunity, these groups fought especially
hard to defeat HEW's regulations. Despite their concerted efforts, they did
not succeed - none of the bills passed and 'the Title IX regulations went
into effect on July 21, 1975.29
3. The Title IX Policy Interpretation. The three year transition period for
compliance with the regulations expired in July of 1978, and HEW's Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) had received nearly one hundred complaints alleging
discrimination in athletics programs by that date. Based on these comments,
OCR determined the need for further guidance "so as to provide a frame-
work within which complaints can be resolved and to provide institutions of
higher education with additional guidance on the requirements of compli-
ance with Title IX." 3' On December 11, 1978, OCR issued a proposed policy
interpretation of the athletics regulations to assist schools in complying with
Title IX.32
As with the Title IX regulations, HEW received a large number of com-
ments on the proposed Title IX athletics guidance.' HEW staff also visited
eight universities during the summer of 1979 to determine "how the pro-
posed policy and other suggested alternatives would apply in actual prac-
tice."' Following the comment period, representatives of OCR met with
interested groups, including women's groups, for additional discussions of
the impact of Title IX guidance.3" After this extensive consideration, the fi-
nal Policy Interpretation was issued in December of 1979. It provided a
detailed set of "factors and standards"36 for determining whether a school
27. See S. Con. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 310, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
28. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 52, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. Con. Res. 311, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
29. See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1995).
30. Acknowledging the dramatic discrimination that existed in most intercollegiate athletic
programs in 1975, the Title IX regulations gave schools three years to come into compliance
with its equal opportunity requirements. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1995) ("[A] recipient which
operates or sponsors . . . athletics at the secondary or post-secondary school level shall com-
ply fully with this section as expeditiously as possible but in no event later than three years
from the effective date of this regulation.").
31. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413 (1979).
32. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,070-76 (1978).
33. Id. (noting that over 700 comments were received).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 413, 71,414. The factors and standards were enumerated for com-
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had complied with Title IX in the area of intercollegiate athletics and also
provided additional documentation of the historical and continuing discrimi-
nation against female college athletes.37
While the Policy Interpretation does not have the force of law, it is the
clearest statement of the enforcing agency's interpretation of the regulatory
criteria for statutory compliance and therefore is accorded substantial defer-
ence by the courts. 8 Thus, the 1979 Policy Interpretation has played a cen-
tral role in the efforts of individual plaintiffs to force schools into compli-
ance with Title IX.
4. Title IX in the 1980's. By the end of the 1970's, the struggles over
Title IX appeared to be over. The law had survived numerous attempts to
weaken its standards, the interpretive regulations had been implemented, the
policy guidance was issued, and schools had been given three full years to
comply with the regulation's athletic requirements.39 Title IX's promise of
equal athletic opportunity for women and girls seemed on the brink of be-
coming a reality. The next decade, however, held a host of unpleasant sur-
prises and battles for proponents of Title IX.
The first blow to the law came in a major Supreme Court decision,
Grove City College v. Bell,' which resulted in the virtual cessation of Title IX
athletics claims both in the courts41 and through the Department of Educa-
tion's (DOE) Office of Civil Rights (OCR).' In a second setback, DOE's
OCR, taking direction from the conservative Reagan and Bush Administra-
tions, made little effort to enforce Title IX through compliance reviews or
complaint investigations. In response, major legislative campaigns had to be
pliance in scholarships, accommodation of interest and abilities, and other program areas such
as equipment, travel, tutoring, coaching and recruitment.
37. The Policy Interpretation includes an appendix enumerating the ways in which ath-
letic programs have developed to favor male participation and the levels of discrimination
against female athletes that existed in the late 1970's. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,419 (1979).
38. See, e.g., Kelley v. University of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 242 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, 35
F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995) ("[T]he Court must give deference
to the regulations and interpretations promulgated under the authority of Congress.").
39. Title IX plaintiffs had also secured an important victory in the Supreme Court in
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court held that Title IX included
an implied private right of action that permitted a plaintiff to proceed directly to court with
a Title IX grievance without first having to bring it before an administrative agency. Id. at
678. The Court found that a private right of action was necessary to achieve Title IX's goal of
providing individuals with protection from discrimination. Id. at 704. The Court also recog-
nized that the limitations of the administrative process as well as inadequate resources at
HEW supported the existence of a private Title IX enforcement mechanism. Id. at 706 n.41,
708 n.42.
40. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
41. However, the provision of athletic scholarships was still covered by Title IX after
Grove City if the institution's financial aid office received federal financial assistance. See Haf-
fer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 16 (3rd Cir. 1982) (per curiam), modified, 678 F. Supp. 517
(E.D. Pa. 1987).
42. HEW was split into the Department of Education and the Department of Health and
Human Services in 1979. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1994). OCR, with authority over Title IX
enforcement, became part of DOE.
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mounted to try to restore Title IX's muscle in the athletics area, requiring
years of effort from advocates and legislators who supported Title IX's non-
discrimination objectives.
a. The Grove City Decision. In the early 1980's, courts divided
over the question whether Title IX's language covered only those programs
within an institution directly receiving federal funds or whether the receipt
of funds in any program resulted in coverage for the entire institution.'
The Grove City decision resolved thls question in favor of the more narrow
interpretation of Title IX's reach, holding that the statute applied only to
those programs or activities that actually received federal funds." In so do-
ing, the Court effectively removed most college athletic programs, which
rarely are direct recipients of federal funds, from Title IX's purview.'
The impact of Grove City on efforts to eradicate discrimination in athlet-
ics programs was substantial. DOE's OCR immediately dropped or narrowed
almost forty pending Title IX athletics investigations. 6 For example, DOE's
OCR had already found "discrimination in the accommodation of women
athletes' interest and abilities as well as in travel allowances, per diems and
support services in the athletics program at the University of Maryland."47
One week after the Grove City decision, DOE's OCR dropped the Title IX
charges against the University because the program did not receive federal
funds.' Grove City also resulted in the suspension of cases where discrimi-
nation had been found and enforcement was being monitored by DOE's
OCR.49 Furthermore, DOE's OCR simply disregarded the complaints of Title
IX violations that continued to flood the office unless the athletic program at
issue could be shown to be a-direct recipient of federal funds.
Grove City also affected the first class action Title IX suit brought
against a university for discriminating against women in all aspects of its
athletics program. Haffer v. Temple University", was filed in 1981 as a Title
IX action, but lawyers were forced to rely on the Equal Protection Clause of
43. Compare Rice v. Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing to
apply Title IX without a claim that sex discrimination occurred in program receiving federal
funds) and University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that an
athletic department which receives no federal funds is not covered by Title IX) with Haffer,
688 F.2d 14, 16 (holding that an athletic department is subject to Title IX when university as
a whole received federal funds).
44. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 572. Grove City College had tried to preserve its autonomy by
refusing to accept money from state or federal government. Its sole source of federal financial
assistance was education grants given its students by the government. Id. at 559.
45. Some athletic scholarships were an exception, see cases cited supra note 43.
46. P. Michael Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Revitalization of Title IX,
1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 149, 159 (1990).
47. See S. REP. NO. 64, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3.
48. Id.
49. For example, OCR stopped monitoring compliance proceedings at Ball State and West-
ern Michigan universities after Grove City. Villalobos, supra note 46, at 162.
50. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 688 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir. 1982) (per curiam), modi-
fied, 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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the Fourteenth Amendment"1 and the state equal rights amendment 2 to
support their claims after the decision in Grove City removed Temple's ath-
letic program from the reach of Title IX. Once the Civil Rights Restoration
Act' was passed in 1988, the Court restored the application of Title IX
claims to most athletic programs. Ultimately, Haffer settled in favor of the
plaintiffs in 1988, eight years after a remedy for gross inequities in athletic
opportunities had first been sought."
b. Legislative Response to Grove City. Congress acted immediately
to correct the narrowing of Title IX that the Grove City decision had accom-
plished, recognizing that the limitation of Title IX coverage to programs
directly receiving federal funds would severely impede its objective of eradi-
cating sex discrimination in education. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1984, introduced in both the Senate and the House, sought to replace the
statutory language "program or activity" with "recipient," thereby restoring
coverage of athletic departments under Title IX.'5
After several years of debate, the Act was passed as the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 and enacted over presidential veto in 1988.' Al-
though the statutory language was modified over the course of debate, it
served the purpose of overruling Grove City. As enacted, the Act broadened
Title IX's definition of "program or activity" to include "all operations of a
[institution] ... any part of which is extended federal financial assis-
tance . . . ."' The Civil Rights Restoration Act therefore clarified that an
entire institution is covered by Title IX if any of its programs or activities is
a recipient of federal funds. Congress included specific findings indicating
that the Act was intended to correct the limitations imposed by Grove City
and to restore "an institution-wide application" of Title IX'
Unlike the debates surrounding Title IX regulations, the debates that
occurred over the Civil Rights Restoration Act did not dispute whether or
not intercollegiate athletic programs should come within the scope of Title
IX.5 9 In fact, these debates revealed a consensus among lawmakers that dis-
crimination against women athletes is a significant civil rights problem de-
serving remedy under Title IX.' A number of the members of Congress
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. PA. CONST. art. I § 28.
53. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, ch. 38, 102 Stat 28 (1988) (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
54. Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 517.
55. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) introduced the bill in the Senate, S. 2568, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), and Representative Paul Simon (D-Ill.) introduced it in the House. H.R.
5490, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
57. Id.
58. Id. Congress found that "certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Su-
preme Court have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of Title IX"
and that "legislative action is necessary to restore the prior consistent and long-standing exec-
utive branch interpretation .... " Id. at 636.
59. A major point of contention that delayed passage of the Act was its implications for
university funding of abortion services. See Senate Votes to Remove "Abortion Rights" from Civil
Rights Bill, Business Wire, Jan. 28, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
60. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. S11,448 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Orrin
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referred explicitly to the ongoing sex discrimination in competitive athletics
as a compelling reason for restoring the broad application of civil rights
laws. 6' These statements serve as important evidence of the remedial objec-
tives of Title IX and the intent of Congress that the statute's protections
provide a strong guarantee of equality in the area of athletics.
Title IX therefore emerged from the 1980's in much the same posture
with which it had entered that decade - with strong congressional support
and clear application to intercollegiate athletic programs, but with its prom-
ise of ending discrimination against female athletes still unfulfilled. The
combination of the Grove City decision with the low priority given to en-
forcement by DOE's OCR undermined the impact of Title IX in changing the
face of our country's athletic programs.
C. Recent Enforcement of Title IX
The passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act and settlement of Haffer
in 1988 appeared to herald a renaissance for Title IX enforcement. With the
law's coverage of athletic programs restored, Title IX proponents had reason
to feel optimistic that more schools would voluntarily come into compliance
with Title IX in order to avoid being sued by private plaintiffs.62
This optimism changed to conviction after the 1992 decision by the
Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinett County Public Schools.' In Franklin, the
Court armed plaintiffs with the powerful weapon of the right to money
damages for an intentional violation of Title IX." Until Franklin, plaintiffs
bringing suit under Title IX could only seek compliance with the law, a
remedy that often held little attraction for students who would graduate
before any changes were made. Giving plaintiffs access to individual relief
made the prospect of a contentious lawsuit more appealing both to plaintiffs
and to the lawyers needed to represent them. The threat of having to pay
Hatch (R-Utah)) ("I personally do not know of any Senator in the Senate-there may be a
few, but very few-who does not want Title IX implemented so as to continue to encourage
women throughout America to develop into Olympic athletes.").
61. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S168 (daily, ed. Jan 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Robert Pack-
wood (R-Or.)) ("Prior to the Grove City case everyone ... thought that the Title IX regula-
tions meant institution-wide coverage. And this, very frankly, is how we were finally able to
get universities and . . .high school, to give equal treatment to women in athletics. This was
the opening wedge."); 130 CONG. REc. 18,534 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Coleman (R-Mo.))
("One of the best examples of women gaining equal access in education thanks to Title IX
has been in the area of athletics.").
62. The threat of private litigation provided a stimulus for change in the absence of pres-
sure from OCR. Because OCR had continued to de-emphasize Title IX enforcement, schools
had little reason to fear an agency investigation until the Clinton administration prioritized
enforcement in 1993. With the advent of private litigation, however, schools could no longer
remain sanguine about inequities in their athletic programs.
63. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
64. Id. The Court held unanimously that monetary damages were available under Title IX
for intentional sex discrimination, basing its decision on the principle that all remedies are
available in a federal action "unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise." Id. at 1066.
Franklin was not an athletics case, but rather a suit brought under Title IX challenging teach-
er-student sexual harassment. Its holding, however, applies to any intentional violation of Title
IX, a category into which most athletics discrimination falls. See ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING
DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE TO TITLE IX 32 (1994).
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out large damage awards also promised to operate as a powerful incentive
for schools to bring their athletic programs, as well as their other education-
al programs, into compliance with Title IX. Perhaps even more importantly,
the availability of damages avoided the problem of student-plaintiffs gradu-
ating from their respective schools and thereby making their legal claims
moot. By including a claim for damages, plaintiffs would still have a justicia-
ble Title IX claim even after graduation. Thus, Franklin represented a major
step forward in Title IX enforcement.'
The elimination of certain women's varsity teams ushered in by shrink-
ing university budgets in the early 1990s has resulted in a surge of Title IX
litigation in recent years. Without exception, the plaintiffs in these cases have
won decisive victories against their schools and contributed to substantial
progress toward equity in intercollegiate athletics. The courts' interpretation
and legal analysis of Title IX in these cases has been remarkably consistent,
providing Title IX proponents with a strong and uniform body of law upon
which to rely.
1. Major Court Decisions. Since 1992, federal courts in the First, Third,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have awarded victories to female student athletes
in Title IX cases.' Additionally, courts in the Seventh and Second Circuits
have interpreted Title IX favorably for female athletes. Each of these deci-
sions has focused on discrimination in the allocation of participation oppor-
tunities between male and female athletes, the primary area emphasized in
recent Title IX athletics challenges.67 In analyzing participation opportuni-
ties, -courts have adopted the three-prong test set out in the Title IX Policy
Interpretation.' If a school can satisfy any one of the test's three prongs, it
65. See generally Peggy Kellers, Breaking the Silence: Twenty Years of Title IX Litigation, 11
SPORTS LAW. 1, 6 (Nov./Dec. 1992) (arguing that no decision has done more to promote Title
"IX litigation and change institutions' athletic priorities); Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A
Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MiAMi ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, 25 (1992) (noting
that, for most of Title IX's history, withholding federal funds was "more of a threat than
actuality.").
66. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994); Favia v.
Indiana Univ., 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen II).
67. The prohibition against discrimination in participation opportunities derives from the
Title IX regulations, which require that "the selection of sports and levels of competition ef-
fectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes." 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(c)(1) (1995). Many Title IX litigants made a strategic choice to focus on this aspect of
Title IX compliance as a means of opening the door to future compliance suits in other areas.
Once equal participation has been guaranteed, they reason, then the battles over athletic schol-
arships and equal treatment can be waged.
Schools violate Title IX if they do not provide financial aid in proportion to rate of par-
ticipation. The Title IX regulations state that if an institution provides athletic financial aid, "it
must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of each sex in proportion
to the number of students of each sex participating in ... intercollegiate athletics." 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.37(c) (1995).
Schools also can violate Title IX by discriminating in athletic benefits such as equipment
and supplies, scheduling, travel and per diems, coaching, tutoring, locker rooms and publicity.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1995). This area is often referred to as the "equal treatment" area.
68. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418. For a comprehensive discussion of why courts rely on the
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is in compliance with Title IX's requirement to provide proportionate partici-
pation opportunities.
Under the first prong, the court examines whether athletic participation
opportunities are provided to each sex in numbers substantially proportion-
ate to their enrollment. If a school cannot meet this prong, the court then
determines whether the school can demonstrate a history and continuing
practice of program expansion for the underrepresented sex. If a school fails
the second prong, the court finally asks whether the athletic interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex have been fully and effectively accom-
modated by the school. If the plaintiffs can show that the school also fails
on this third prong, then the court must find the school out of compliance
with Title IX.
In applying this three-prong test, courts have arrived at the same con-
clusion: that the schools that have been challenged to date have failed to
provide adequate opportunity to their female athletes and thereby are violat-
ing federal law.
a. Cohen v. Brown University.69 In 1991, Brown University de-
cided to cut two women's teams and two men's teams from its athletics pro-
gram, changing the status of these teams from varsity to club and removing
all of their funding. Members of the women's teams brought a class action
suit against Brown, claiming that the demotion of the women's teams vio-
lated Title IX because the university provided disproportionate participation
opportunities to men and women.' The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to
reinstate the two dropped teams and to prevent Brown from eliminating any
other women's varsity teams."
The district court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction, which
Brown immediately appealed to the court of appeals.72 In both courts,
Brown argued that Title IX compliance should be measured by comparing
participation opportunities with the relative interests of male and female,
students, as measured by Brown, rather than the percentage of each sex in
the undergraduate enrollment.' In effect, Brown asked the courts to over-
look the fewer opportunities it provided to female athletes because neither
men nor women are fully accommodated, even though men enjoyed almost
twice as many participation opportunities as women.'
The First Circuit rejected Brown's arguments using the same legal
analysis as the district court. Applying the three-prong test outlined above
three-prong test, see Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 888.
69. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); 879 F.
Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III) (collectively referred to as Cohen).
70. Cohen 1, 809 F. Supp. at 978; Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 185.
71. Cohen 1, 809 F. Supp. at 980.
72. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 888.
73. Cohen 1, 809 F. Supp. at 987; Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899. For a fuller discussion of Bro-
wn's arguments and their weaknesses, see infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
74. In 1991-92, Brown had 529 male athletes (63.4%) and 305 female athletes (36.6%).
Cohen 1, 809 F. Supp. at 981. During that same year, the undergraduate enrollment was 51.8%
male and 48.2% women. Id. at 991.
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and rejecting Brown's attempts to rewrite Title IX policy, both courts rea-
soned that Brown failed all three prongs and therefore did not effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of its female athletes.' The First
Circuit labelled Brown's construction of Title IX "myopic," stating that "the
fact that the overrepresented gender is less than fully accommodated will
not, in and of itself, excuse a shortfall in the provision of opportunities for
the underrepresented gender."76
At the subsequent trial on the merits, Brown lost again under the appli-
cation of the three-prong test.' The creativity of Brown's arguments could
not mask the fact that it had neither substantially equivalent participation
opportunities for men and women nor a continuing history of program ex-
pansion for women, and the school further could not demonstrate that the
athletic interests and abilities of its female students hid been met. Brown
has appealed the district court's decision.78
b. Roberts v. Colorado State University' 9. In 1992, Colorado State
University (CSU) dropped its women's varsity softball team. Team members
sued for reinstatement of their team and for compensatory damages, alleging
CSU failed to provide equivalent participation opportunities to female ath-
letes under Title IX' a CSU argued that it had not violated Title IX because
it had also dropped men's baseball when cutting the softball team, and that
the cuts had had a larger negative impact on male athletes.8
The district court did not accept CSU's argument, finding that the uni-
versity failed each prong of the three-prong test.82 While most of its legal
75. The district court, after establishing that the three-prong test was the proper one to
apply in the case, examined each prong separately. Because women represented 48.2% of the
undergraduate population but were only 36.6% of varsity athletes, Brown clearly could not
win under the first prong. Id. at 991. The court also found that Brown failed the second
prong because its participation numbers had remained at roughly 60% men and 35% women
for over 10 years, indicating no continuing practice of program expansion. Id. Finally, the
court found that Brown had "cut off varsity opportunities where there is great interest and
talent and where Brown still has an imbalance between male and female athletes in relation
to their undergraduate enrollments" and therefore could not satisfy the third prong of the
test. Id. at 992.
In affirming the decision of the district court, the court of appeals firmly endorsed the
use of the three-prong test as the controlling Title IX analysis and rejected Brown's alternative
test, noting that "Brown's approach cannot withstand scrutiny on either legal or policy
grounds." Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 900.
76. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899.
77. Cohen 11, 879 F. Supp. at 185. The district court's opinion carefully set out the legal
framework of Title IX, its regulations and the Policy Interpretation before explaining its in-
terpretation of the requirements of the three-prong test. After considering Brown's alternative
approaches, the court found that none of them provided Brown with an escape hatch from
Title IX's mandate and therefore Brown was in violation of the law.
78. William C. Rhoden, A Partisan Spin on Title IX, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1995, at 31.
79. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993) (Roberts I), affd sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State
Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (Roberts II), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993) (Rob-
erts III) (collectively referred to as Roberts).
80. Roberts L 814 F. Supp. at 1507.
81. Id. at 1514.
82. Id. at 1518-19.
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analysis followed the same path as that of the Cohen court, the district court
in Roberts emphasize4 several important principles in Title IX jurisprudence.
First, the court held that a school cannot satisfy the second prong, a history
and continuing practice of program expansion for women, by simply point-
ing to an initial spurt of expansion in opportunities for women shortly after
Title IX was enacted. It also cannot claim to have "expanded" women's
share of opportunities by cutting more from its men's than its women's ath-
letic programs.' Second, the court held that a disparity of 10.6% between
the percentage of female athletes and the percentage of female students did
not meet the "substantially proportionate" standard of the first prong."
Thus, while it remains unclear where the outer boundaries of the "substan-
tially proportionate" measure lie, a disparity of 10% was too great for this
court.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed both the district court's use of the
three-prong test as the appropriate measure of effective accommodation and
its conclusion that CSU could satisfy none of the prongs.' The appeals
court did overrule the district court on one point, agreeing with the First
Circuit's ruling in Cohen that the plaintiffs b ar the burden of proving a lack
of accommodation of female athletes' interelts and abilities under the test's
third prong.' Under this new standard, the Tenth Circuit found that plain-
tiffs had met their burden and therefore CSU failed the third prong as well
as the first two and were not in compliance with Title IX.
87
c. Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania'. Factually, the
Favia case is very similar to Cohen. Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP)
demoted two men's and two women's varsity teams to club status and cut
off their funding. As in Cohen, the women's team members sued as a class
for reinstatement of their teams.89
Legally, the court had no difficulty in concluding that IUP was likely to
be found in violation of Title IX because of failure to satisfy any of the
prongs of the three-prong test. In a succinct opinion, the court found that
IUP did not offer women athletic opportunities in substantial proportion to
their enrollment, would not be likely to demonstrate a practice of continuing
83. Id. at 1514. The court states that:
CSU cannot show program expansion for women solely by pointing to increases in
percentages of women athletes caused by the reduction of male athletes. CSU must
either demonstrate actual expansion ... or establish that it has considered and
improved upon the underrepresented status of women athletes when reductions in
athletic programs became necessary in the past.
Id.
84. Id. at 1513. The court used Cohen, where the disparity between the percentage of
female athletes and percentage of female students was 11.6%, as guidance on the meaning of
"substantially proportionate." Id.
85. Roberts II, 998 F.2d at 829-32.
86. Id. at 831.
87. Id. at 832. After losing on appeal, CSU appealed to the Supreme Court, but certiorari
was denied. Roberts II, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
88. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1992), motion to modify denied, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
89. Id.
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expansion of women's opportunities, and would not be able to show that the
athletic interests and abilities of it female students had been fully and effec-
tively accommodated.' The court therefore granted a preliminary injunction
to the plaintiffs restoring their two teams and preventing IUP from making
any further cuts to women's varsity athletic opportunities.91
Although IUP did not appeal the district court's decision, it later sought
modification of the district court's order to replace one of the reinstated
teams with a different women's sport. 2 When the court denied the modifi-
cation on procedural grounds, IUP appealed to the Third Circuit. Declining
to alter the original injunction, the Third Circuit noted that substituting one
team for the other did not "substantially ameliorate what the district court
decided was likely to be a violation of Title IX."93 The court of appeals also
adopted the district court's application of the three-part test, citing Cohen
approvingly. 4
d. Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Association95 . In
one of the few Title IX decisions involving high school athletes, twelve fe-
male softball players filed a Title IX discrimination suit when their state
athletic association refused to sanction fast-pitch softball for girls despite
sanctioning fewer sports for girls than for boys overall. After losing on sum-
mary judgment in the district court, the plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Cir-
cuit.96
Reversing the award of summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit first con-
firmed that Kentucky's high school programs came within reach of Title IX's
protections because they received federal financial assistance. 7 The court
then looked to the three-prong test to analyze whether the state high schools
had complied with Title IX's mandate of equal opportunity. Citing Cohen
and Roberts for support, the court outlined the elements of the test and con-
cluded that genuine issues existed as to whether the state provided equal
athletic opportunity to its female students.9" The court therefore remanded
the case to the district court. Although it is not a decision on the merits,
Horner provides further support for the application of the three-prong test in
90. Id. at 584-85. The court found that IUP could not satisfy the first prong because fe-
male students comprised only 36.5% of the school's varsity athletes yet 55.6% of the under-
graduate population. IUP also failed the second prong because it had cut women's teams,
taking "the level of opportunities for women to compete [from] low to lower." The court
found that lUP could not meet the third prong either and rejected the school's defense of
financial constraints. Id. at 585.
91. Id. at 585.
92. Favia, 7 F.3d at 336.
93. Id. at 343. The court of appeals denied the modification on the grounds that "the
University had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a 'significant' change in
facts ...." Id. at 344.
94. Id. at 343-44.
95. 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 271-72.
98. Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 272-75 (6th Cir. 1994). The
case was remanded for trial on the Title IX claim.
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evaluating participation opportunities and endorses the legal reasoning used
by the First and Tenth Circuits in deciding such cases.
e. Other Court Decisions. Both the Second and the Seventh Circuits
have also applied consistent standards for interpreting Title IX's re-
quirements in recent cases. While these cases involve somewhat different le-
gal analyses than the circuit cases described above, they further elucidate the
approach of federal courts to Title IX in the area of nondiscriminatory partic-
ipation opportunities.
In Cook v. Colgate University,' the plaintiffs went to court seeking ele-
vation of the women's club ice hockey team to varsity status after the col-
lege had repeatedly denied their requests to do so. Pointing to the vast ineq-
uities between the women's club ice hockey team and the men's varsity ice
hockey team, the plaintiffs argued that Title IX required the college to have
a women's varsity team so as to provide equality of opportunity."° Colgate
argued in defense that Title IX did not mandate equality on a sport-by-sport
basis, but rather required proportionality in the men's and women's pro-
grams as a whole.'
The district court sided with the plaintiffs, finding that because there
were gross inequities in the opportunities available to male and female hock-
ey players, Colgate had violated Title IX.' 2 Although the district court's -
analysis stands alone in choosing to compare opportunities on a sport-spe-
cific level, 3 its finding of discrimination was certainly merited. On a pro-
gram-wide basis, Colgate clearly failed the three-prong test in much the
same way Brown University, Colorado State University and Indiana Univer-
sity at Pennsylvania had. It did not offer substantially proportionate athletic
opportunities to women, did not have a continuing history of expansion, and
had not fully and effectively accommodated its female athletes."l
The Seventh Circuit had occasion to interpret Title IX in Kelley v. Board
of Trustees of the University of Illinois." The reverse-discrimination case was
brought by members of the men's varsity swimming team that had recently
been eliminated at the University of Illinois. The plaintiffs claimed discrimi-
nation because the women's swimming team had not been cut in the institu-
tional effort to reduce expenses. Applying the three-prong test, the district
99. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2nd Cir. 1993)
100. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-45.
101. Id. at 742.
102. Id. at 751. The court voiced strong sentiments in support of Title IX, stating that
"many institutions of higher education apparently hold the opinion that providing equality to
women in athletics is both a luxury and a burden. The feeling seems to be that to afford
such equality to women is a gift and not a right. The women's ice hockey players do not
want a gift. They obviously do not consider equivalent treatment to be a luxury. The women
only want equal athletic opportunities. That is what the law demands." Id. at 750.
103. For a discussion of why the district court's reasoning contravenes the general princi-
ples of Title IX, see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
104. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 742-45.
105. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Il. 1993), affd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 938 (1995).
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court did not find a Title IX violation because, even after the cuts, women
continued to receive a lesser share of the school's athletic opportunities. 6
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision, once again deferring to
the Policy Interpretation's three-part test for Title IX compliance in this ar-
ea.
10 7
2. Major Settlements. Numerous Title IX suits brought by student plain-
tiffs since Franklin have settled without a final ruling on the merits by a
court.'Os While these settlements do not have the same precedential value
as the decisions discussed above, they further reflect the momentum Title IX
has gained over the last few years.
In a Title IX challenge against the University of Texas at Austin, the
plaintiffs obtained a landmark settlement requiring the university to greatly
increase women's share of athletic opportunities at the institution. Female
student athletes at UT-Austin filed a class action suit against the university
seeking elevation of four club teams to varsity status. At the time, women
represented 47% of the undergraduate enrollment and only 23% of the varsi-
ty athletes. The students alleged violations of Title IX based on discrimina-
tion in participation opportunities.
In July of 1993, the University settled with the plaintiffs, agreeing to
bring the women's varsity participation rate up to 44% by the end of the
1995-96 school year and to maintain that rate thereafter.'" The University
also agreed to elevate two of the women's club teams, soccer and softball, to
varsity status, and to review its program to gauge the necessity of adding
other varsity teams."0 The settlement included a requirement that the per-
centage of athletic scholarships given female athletes be within two percent-
age points of their participation rate and a requirement that the facilities for
women's teams be of the quality necessary to attract top athletes."'
The Sanders settlement served as a model for the later settlement of a
Title IX challenge to Virginia Polytechnical Institute. In March 1995, student
athletes obtained a settlement in a class action challenge to the university's
failure to provide sufficient varsity opportunities for women athletes. The
university agreed to bring women's athletic participation rates within 3% of
their enrollment rates by 1998 and to add lacrosse and softball as varsity
women's sports. The school also agreed to bring the percentage of scholar-
106. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 269-70.
107. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272-75. For a more extensive discussion of Kelley, see infra notes
181-82 and accompanying text.
108. In addition to the settlements discussed in detail below, Cornell University, University
of California at Los Angeles, University of New Hampshire, Auburn University, University of
Texas at Austin, California State University at Fullerton, and University of Massachusetts have
all settled suits with female student athletes in the last three years. See T. Jesse Wilde, Gender
Equity in Athletics: Coming of Age in the 90's, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 217, 240-45 (1994). The first
major Title IX case to be litigated, Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982) also
ended in a settlement favorable to the plaintiffs eight years after filing. See supra notes 49-50
and accompanying text.
109. Sanders v. University of Tex. at Austin, No. A-92-CA-405 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 1993)
(order approving settlement agreement).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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ship money flowing to female athletes to within 5% of their enrollment
rates.
112
D. Continuing Resistance to Equality in Athletics
Despite Title IX's many victories over the last several years, equality for
female athletes remains an unmet goal at most schools. The combined threat
of private suits and more vigorous enforcement by DOE's OCR has not had
the motivating effect one might expect on the vast majority of institutions.
The rapid gains made by female athletes in the 1970's have not been
matched in the 1990's, and the opportunities for women's athletic participa-
tion continue to be limited.
While women today represent over half the undergraduates in our col-
leges and universities, schools continue to limit female athletes to approxi-
mately one-third of our country's varsity slots. A 1992 survey conducted by
the NCAA showed that women in Division I colleges receive less than one-
third of athletic scholarship dollars, one-sixth of recruiting dollars and only
one-fifth of overall athletic budgets.113 The Chronicle of Higher Education re-
cently reported that at the end of the 1993-94 school year, only sixteen Divi-
sion I colleges provided athletic opportunities to women in proportion to
their enrollment."4 Each year, male athletes receive $179 million more in
scholarship money than female athletes."' Furthermore, since the enactment
of Title IX, for each new dollar spent on women's programs, two new dol-
lars were spent on men's programs."6
Notwithstanding the slow progress toward achieving gender equity in
college sports at the national level, some schools have chosen to take a lead-
ership role in the area of Title IX compliance rather than wait to be the
subject of legal proceedings. For example, in 1993, Stanford University creat-
ed a Women's Sports Enhancement Program to add three new varsity wom-
en's sports and twenty-nine additional scholarships for female athletes by
1997.117 The program also increases the number of trainers, academic advi-
sors, and publicity staff available to the women's teams."' Stetson Univer-
sity has also worked hard to meet Title IX's goal of gender equity - in the
last three years, the number of varsity athletic slots for women has gone
from 37% to 53%, and scholarship money has increased by over 12%.119
A law passed by Congress in 1994 should facilitate the identification of
both violators of Title IX and those who have come into compliance. The
112. James v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., No. 94-0031-R (W.D. Va. Apr. 12, 1995) (order
approving settlement agreement).
113. NATIONAL COLLEGE ATHLETIC ASS'N, GENDER EQUITY SURVEY (1992).
114. Debra E. Blum, Slow Progress on Equity, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Oct.
26, 1994, at A47.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Don Bosley, Stanford Will Bolster Its Women's Programs, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 31, 1993,
at E2. Carolyn White, Stanford's Plan Sets Example, USA TODAY (Arlington, Va.), Nov. 7, 1995,
at 3C.
118. Id.
119. Debra E. Blum, Stetson University Works Hard to Meet Its Goal of Gender Equity, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 26, 1994, at A47.
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Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act12 requires schools to publish data such
as the number of male and female athletes in their programs each year,
starting in October 1996.121 These numbers will allow female athletes to eval-
uate where they will receive the most equitable treatment1" and will assist
the public in encouraging schools to treat athletes in a non-discriminatory
fashion.
As the recent history of Title IX enforcement demonstrates, unless most
institutions increase the pace of the progress toward gender equity, they are
subjecting themselves to a substantial risk of court-ordered changes and
damages through Title IX litigation. In light of current legal climate, the ex-
pansion of women's athletic opportunities should be a top priority for col-
lege sports programs.
II. THE BACKLASH AGAINST TITLE IX
Largely as a result of the long-overdue progress toward gender equity
ushered in by the recent court successes, a vocal and organized backlash has
developed in which opponents seek to turn back the clock on Title IX en-
forcement. Led by a coalition of football coaches and spokespersons for other
men's sports (often referred to as men's "minor" sports or non-revenue pro-
ducing sports), these forces have launched a full scale assault on Title IX
through grassroots organizing, lobbying of Congress and the Department of
Education, and the marketing of their message to the press.'23
A. Anti-Title IX Efforts in Congress
With the changed political climate after the 1994 elections, Title IX op-
ponents are hoping to find a renewed opportunity to slow or even stop the
progress towards gender equity that has been made over the past two de-
cades. While past Congresses have safeguarded Title IX's protections, 4 the
120. Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 360B, 108 Stat. 3969, 3969-71 (1994).
121. The Act also requires schools to provide a listing of the varsity teams. For each team,
the school must disclose the number of participants, the total operating expenses, whether the
head coach was male or female and full or part-time, and the number, sex and employment
status of assistant coaches. The school must also report the total amount of athletically-related
student aid for men's teams and women's teams, the revenues generated by men's and wom-
en's teams, and the average institutional coaching salaries (for both head and assistant coach-
es) for men's and women's teams. Id. § 360(B)(g).
122. The Act includes a finding that "knowledge of an institution's expenditures for wom-
en's and men's athletic programs would help prospective students and prospective student
athletes make informed judgnents about the commitments of a given institution of higher
education to providing equitable athletic benefits to its men and women students." Id.
§ 360 (B)(b)(8).
123. The two most prominent organizations representing college football interests in this
battle are the American Football Coaches Association and the College Football Association.
They have been joined by a number of organizations representing other men's sports pro-
grams, including the National Wrestling Coaches Association, the National Association of
College Gymnastics Coaches, the National Soccer Coaches' Association of America, United
States Swimming and United States Water Polo.
124. See, e.g., supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act and the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, and their effects on Title IX litiga-
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new Congress is now being tested by those who would like to reduce the
power and effectiveness of Title IX, and they are using the politically
charged "quota" label to bolster their chances."z In using the "quota" label,
Title IX opponents are attempting to tap into the anti-quota sentiment that is
now in the forefront of the affirmative action debate, regardless of the inap-
plicability of that label. One of most vocal champions of the Title IX oppo-
nents is Representative Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.), who is a former men's wres-
tling coach and the former president of the National Wrestling Coaches
Association. Although Representative Hastert had previously been an outspo-
ken advocate for men's sports interests in Congress,'26 his efforts have only
recently generated any noticeable support from his colleagues.'27
As in the past, some of the most emphatic voices lobbying against Title
IX today are spokespersons for college football interests, who maintain that
current Title IX interpretations threaten the future of college football because
schools will be forced to cut football budgets in order to fund more oppor-
tunities for women. 2 In late 1994, the College Football Association (CFA)
and the American Football Coaches' Association (AFCA) requested congres-
sional hearings on gender equity in athletics, with an eye toward exempting
football from the law's requirements, eliminating proportionality as any part
of the three-prong test for participation opportunities, or otherwise weaken-
ing Title IX. 129
Some spokespersons for men's non-revenue producing sports, which
have borne the brunt of financial cuts at many universities, are joining ranks
tion).
125. See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Rights Debate: Both Sides Uneasy, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1995, at
A13 (noting that congressional Republicans calling to revisit affirmative action "use the term
interchangeably with 'quotas' and 'set-asides.'").
126. Amateur Sports and the Olympic Committee: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Rep. Hastert, For-
mer President of the National Wrestling Coaches Association) (arguing that Title IX hurts
men's sports opportunities). Representative Hastert also circulated to his colleagues in Con-
gress a letter dated October 6, 1994, with an attached survey and Title IX position paper,
conveying that same message.
127. In a letter dated June 8, 1995, Rep. Hastert asked his colleagues in the House to join
him in urging the DOE to amend its 1979 Policy Interpretation to make prongs two and
three of the three-part test more lenient. He ultimately obtained signatures from 133 of his
colleagues on a letter dated June 7, 1995, addressed to Norma V. Cantu, the Assistant Secre-
tary for Civil Rights in the DOE, requesting that the Department weaken Title IX. Thirty-sev-
en of these signatories are first-term representatives, reflecting the change in the political cli-
mate ushered in by the new Congress.
In contrast, a letter dated July 21, 1995, sent by Rep. Patsy J. Mink (D-Haw.) and Rep.
Lynn C. Woolsey (D-Cal.) to Secretary Cantu supporting Title IX as currently interpreted
included signatures by 94 House members, only two of which were first-term members of
Congress.
128, See, e.g., Athelia Knight, Title IX Scrutinized at Hearings, WASH. POST, May 10, 1995, at
11. Specifically, many football coaches blame Title IX for NCAA actions to trim the maximum
number of football scholarships per school from an unlimited number to the current limit of
85. See, e.g., John Henderson, Title IX Battle Rages On; Football Bosses Go On Offensive, DENv.
POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at 7B.
129. Athelia Knight, Football Coaches Put Title IX on Defensive, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1995, at
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with the football coaches in blaming Title IX for their losses."3 Pointing to
a trend among some universities to drop men's teams in certain sports, the
coalition is claiming that the future of some men's sports, such as gymnas-
tics, is now in jeopardy because of the high demands of female athletes for
equity. 31 Rather than criticizing bloated football and men's basketball bud-
gets, which together consume over 70% of the total men's athletic operating
budgets, these groups have made the calculated decision that gender equity
is an easier opponent. 32 By pitting women's sports against men's non-reve-
nue sports, this coalition is placing women against certain male athletes,
leaving football and men's basketball free to continue their excesses.'
At the request of the AFCA and the CFA, in conjunction with the mi-
nor men's sports coalition, the Post-Secondary and Lifelong Learning Sub-
committee of the Economic and Educational Opportunities Committee in the
U.S. House of Representatives held hearings on Title IX on May 9, 1995.
Representatives of the football coaches, men's minor sports groups, and two
universities found in violation of Title IX, Brown University and Eastern
Illinois University, gave testimony expressing their grievances with Title IX
as applied by the DOE and the courts.' 34
While legislation weakening the substantive standards of Title IX and
the three-part test has not yet emerged from these hearings, such efforts may
be on the horizon. After the May hearings, the Chair of the Subcommittee,
Representative Howard P. ("Buck") McKeon (R-Cal.), joined by Representa-
tive Steve Gunderson (R-Wis.), a member of the subcommittee, asked DOE's
OCR to issue policy guidance "clarifying" prongs two and three of the three-
part test, and suggesting that such guidance might obviate the need for
130. See Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary
Education, Training and Lifelong Learning of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational Oppor-
tunities, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1995) (testimony of T.J. Kerr, President of the National
Wrestling Coaches Association) (stating that over one hundred college wrestling programs
have been dropped as a result of Title IX) [hereinafter Gender Equity Hearings].
131. Richard Sandomir, Brown Is Told Program Cheats Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at
Al.
132. See, e.g., Scorecard: The Third Sex, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 6, 1995, at 15 (citing Rep.
Hastert's reluctance to blame football for cutbacks on more low-profile men's sports because
he does not want to "take on a national shrine").
133. Examples of excess expenditures on the part of these programs include the regular
practice of paying for football teams to stay in hotels the night before home games, see, e.g.,
id.; spending millions to buy out the contracts of losing coaches and replacing them with new
ones, id.; the practice of coaches accompanying recruits back home after on-campus visits
(until the NCAA recently banned such practice), see, e.g., Tom Witosky, New Battle Erupts in
War of Sexes, DES MOINES SUNDAY REG., Feb. 5, 1995, at 1D; and the allocation of 85 football
scholarships when a comparable team could be supported by 50 scholarships divided among
85 players and supplemented by non-athletic need-based financial aid, see, e.g., Donna Lop-
iano, Sportsviews: Problems Solvable Without Damaging Success of Football, USA TODAY (Washing-
ton, D.C.), May 9, 1995, at 2C.
134. The witness list also included strong advocates for gender equity, including
spokespersons from the Women's Sports Foundation, the National Association of Collegiate
Women Athletic Administrators, and the Athletic Director at Washington State University,
which has achieved gender equity without cutting men's sports. Gender Equity Hearings, supra
note 130 (witness list).
72 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY
legislative action." In response, DOE's OCR promised to issue additional
policy guidance by the Fall of 1995."3
Rather than wait for DOE's OCR to issue policy guidance, the House
Appropriations Committee included a restriction in an appropriations bill
that would forbid DOE's OCR from spending any funds to enforce Title IX
in athletics unless the Department issued policy guidance by December 31,
1995, which includes "objective criteria" clarifying prongs two and three of
the three-part test.137 Although the restriction, on its face, simply required
OCR to "clarify" the three-part test, leading supporters of the amendment
intended it to be a first step toward weakening Title IX. 3 A last minute
compromise brokered by Representative Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.) and Rep-
resentative Hastert made the restriction less objectionable to Title IX support-
ers by changing the word "objective" to "specific." 139 This change was
made in response to protestations from Title IX supporters that the former
language would allow schools to challenge the forthcoming policy guidance
as being not sufficiently "objective" if they disagreed with its substantive
standards. This was less of a danger with the modified language, as any
new policy guidance would add more specificity to the agency's earlier pro-
nouncements. The final bill, which passed in the House, included the Title
IX restriction with the compromise language.
After the Houge passed the appropriations bill"4 with the Title IX re-
striction, DOE's OCR issued a proposed policy guidance clarifying the three-
part test on September 20, 1995. The agency allowed a thirty day comment
period for interested organizations to comment on the proposed draft before
it issued the guidance in final form in January of 1996.
The policy guidance provides further clarity on how institutions may
comply with prongs two and three of the test, and reaffirms the Depart-
ment's commitment that a school may comply with Title IX by meeting any
one of the three parts of the test. The guidance includes specific examples of
fact patterns which would and would not comply with prong two, and clari-
135. Letter to Secretary Cantu from Rep. McKeon and Rep. Gunderson, May 24, 1995 (on
file with the National Women's Law Center).
136. Letter to Rep. McKeon and Rep. Gunderson from Secretary Cantu, June 9, 1995 (on
file with the National Women's Law Center).
137. See, e.g., Douglas Lederman, House Bill Targets Enforcement of Federal Sex-Bias Law in
College Sports, CHRN. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 4, 1995, at A26. The proposed
policy guidance was issued on September 20, 1995, and issued in final form in January 1996.
See infra text accompanying note 140.
138. A factsheet circulated by Rep. Ernest J. Istook, Jr. (R-Okla.), who introduced the a-
mendment in the appropriations committee, attacked Title IX for hurting men's opportunities
to participate in sports (on file with the National Women's Law Center). Rep. Istook intro-
duced the amendment at the behest of the football and wrestling associations. See Letter to
the Honorable Ernest Istook from Grant Teaff, Director of the American Football Coaches'
Association, July 20, 1995 (on file with the National Women's Law Center); Letter to the Hon-
orable Ernest Istook from Charles M. Neinas, Executive Director of the College Football Asso-
ciation, July 20, 1995 (on file with the National Women's Law Center); Letter to the Honor-
able Ernest Jim Istook from T.J. Kerr, President of the National Wrestling Coaches Association,
July 20, 1995 (on file with the National Women's Law Center).
139. H.R. 2127, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 308 (1995).
140. Id.
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fies the criteria DOE's OCR will examine in determining unmet interest and
ability on the part of the underrepresented sex under prong three. Those
critics of DOE's OCR who are truly concerned with the need for clarity
should be satisfied by the Department's new guidance. However, because the
policy guidance does not retreat from the principles established in the De-
partment's 1979 three-part test for compliance, it will not satisfy the football
and men's minor sports advocates or their supporters in Congress, who
contend that Title IX is hurting men's opportunities.14'
The policy clarification should change the debate over whether the final
appropriations law will include a restriction on spending to enforce Title IX
similar to that passed by the House. At the time of this writing, no such
restriction had been included in the Senate's companion appropriations
bill". , although such an amendment could still be added when the Senate
considers the bill on the floor. It remains to be seen whether a similar or
modified Title IX restriction will be added to the Senate bill before final
passage, or, if added, whether such a restriction will become law."43
Most likely, the real war against Title IX will be fought not in the ap-
propriations process through spending restrictions on DOE's OCR, but in the
substantive arena over proposed legislation to weaken Title IX and its regu-
latory standards. Already the battle lines are being drawn with members of
both the House and Senate taking sides on Title IX in dueling letters ex-
pressing support or concern for Title IX's application to intercollegiate athlet-
ics. Competing letters by Representative Hastert and members of the House
Women's Caucus led by Representatives Mink and Woolsey have circulated
in the House. Representative Hastert's letter urges House members to sign a
letter to Norma V. Cantu, DOE's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, asking
the Department to weaken the three-part test while the Women's Caucus'
letter urges the Department not to retreat in its interpretations and enforce-
ment of Title IX. 1"
Similar letters criticizing or supporting Title IX were also circulated in
the Senate by Senator John B. Breaux (D-La.), with twenty-two Senate signa-
tures, and Senators Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), with
twenty-three Senate signatures."4 The letter initiated by Senator Breaux ex-
141. See, e.g., Douglas Lederman, U.S. Civil-Rights Office Attempts to Clarify Gender Equity in
Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc. (Washington, D.C.), Sept. 29, 1995, at A65.
142. S. Rep. No. 145, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
143. If a Title IX restriction were included in the final bill passed by the Senate, there
would still be two opportunities to prevent the restriction from becoming law. First, it could
be omitted during the House-Senate conference on the bill, and second, the President could
veto the entire Labor-HHS appropriations legislation, as he has promised to do. See, e.g., Rob-
ert C. Johnston & Mark Pitsch, Senate Spending Bill Blocked; Loan Cuts Advance, EDUC. WK.
(Washington, D.C.), Oct. 4, 1995, at 17 (noting that President Clinton has threatened to veto
both the House and Senate versions of the Labor-HHS appropriations bill because of cuts in
education spending).
144. See Letter to Secretary Cantu from Rep. Hastert and 135 additional members of the
House of Representatives, June 7, 1995 (on file with the National Women's Law Center); Let-
ter to Secretary Cantu from Rep. Mink, Rep. Woolsey and 92 additional members of the
House of Representatives, July 21, 1995 (on file with the National Women's Law Center).
145. See Letter to Secretary Richard W. Riley from Senator John Breaux and twenty-one
additional Senators, Dec. 22, 1994 (on file with National Women's Law Center); Letter to Sec-
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pressed concern that continued enforcement of the three-part test would
harm college football programs, and that DOE's OCR mandates proportional-
ity while ignoring prongs two and three of the three-part test. Secretary
Cantu responded with a letter to Senator Breaux dated January 10, 1995,
reassuring the Senators that DOE's OCR continues to equally apply all three
parts of the test, and that schools may comply with any one of the three
parts of the test to comply with Title IX. Although Senator Breaux indicated
that he was satisfied with this response, at least one other Senator seemed
less than convinced."4 Senators Stevens and Bradley, joined by twenty-one
other Senators, responded to the concerns raised by the Breaux letter in their
own letter to Department of Education Secretary Richard W. Riley. The
Bradley/Stevens letter expressed strong continued support for Title IX and
addressed claims that Title IX has hurt men's sports programs.
It is unclear whether the anti-Title IX forces will generate enough sup-
port in Congress or the DOE to weaken Title IX's regulatory enforcement
scheme. Although legislation modifying Title IX's substantive standards has
not yet been introduced, such legislation may take the form of the changes
proposed by Representative Hastert in his June 7, 1995 letter to Secretary
Cantu. Representative Hastert proposed to weaken the three-part test by
making prongs two and three of the test easier for schools to satisfy. For
example, he suggested that institutions should be found to be in compliance
with prong two if they have added an average of one sport for women
every three years since Title IX was enacted. Under this formula, any institu-
tion that had added seven women's sports after 1972 would automatically
comply with the law. Because most schools had few if any teams for women
prior to 1972, and because most institutions now offer at least seven
women's sports, this interpretation would render the three-part test virtually
meaningless. In addition, Representative Hastert suggested that student inter-
est under prong three be measured by college entrance exams. Under Repre-
sentative Hastert's proposal, an institution would not be out of compliance
under prong three if such exams did not show unmet interest, even if other
more reliable measures, such as a thriving women's club sport which had
been repeatedly denied varsity status, did demonstrate unmet interest on the
part of the underrepresented sex. Overall, Representative Hastert's proposals
would eviscerate the three-part test and halt any expansion of women's
athletic opportunities required under Title IX.
While the specific terms of the debate over whether to weaken Title IX
have not been set, the continuing controversy surrounding this issue ensures
that the issue will not soon be forgotten. The anti-Title IX forces are prepar-
ing for a long battle, and congressional interest in revisiting Title IX remains
uncertain.
retary Richard W. Riley from Senators Bill Bradley, Ted Stevens and 21 additional Senators,
May 15, 1995 (on file with the National Women's Law Center).
146. Knight, supra note 129, at C4 (noting Senator Breaux's satisfaction with the Cantu
letter but quoting Senator J. James Exon (D-Neb.) as stating that he "wasn't particularly reas-
sured").
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B. Myth Meets Backlash: Quotas, Reverse Discrimination and Special
Treatment for Football
A central tenet of the philosophy of the opponents of Title IX, and the
primary argument invoked against the three-part test's use of "substantially
proportionate" participation rates as a measure of compliance, is the argu-
ment that men are more interested in sports than women and so deserve to
compete in greater numbers. This argument presupposes that interest levels
can be accurately measured in a manner that does not simply reflect existing
disparities in the opportunities available to male and female athletes.147 Ac-
cepting that premise, the argument continues, any substantially proportionate
requirement that does not take into account women's lesser interest in sports
turns Title IX into a quota that enforces reverse discrimination against men.
The football coaches and minor men's sport advocates are advancing this
argument in the halls of Congress, hoping to benefit from the emotional
impact of "quota" language that implies arbitrariness or lack of merit, paral-
leling the strategy of affirmative action opponents.1"
Another major argument advanced in support of revising the three-part
test or otherwise weakening Title IX is that football deserves special treat-
ment, and that the DOE never properly implemented the Javits Amendment
by taking into account the unique features of this sport.49 The size of the
sport, the fact that it is played only by men, and its unique potential to
produce revenue are all advanced as justifications for treating football differ-
ently. Some men's minor sports groups have supported this strategy, believ-
ing that once football is exempted, their sports will no longer feel the
squeeze of Title IX.
Neither argument survives scrutiny as a justification for weakening Title
IX.
1. The "Quota" Argument and the Myth of Reverse Discrimination. In a
cynical effort to benefit from the affirmative action debate in Congress and
across the country, the leaders of the backlash against gender equity in
sports are arguing that Title IX, as it has been applied by the courts and
DOE's OCR, mandates reverse discrimination against men because the three-
part test does not take into account men's relatively greater interest in sports
than women's. The primary strategy of the Title IX opponents has been to
emphasize proportionality as the single or the most important test applied
by the courts and DOE's OCR, and then equate "substantially proportionate"
147. In support of the assertedly greater levels of athletic interest among men, Title IX
opponents cite national data on participation ratios at the high school and college level, as
well as studies asking young men and women if they plan to participate in sports at the
college level. See, e.g., Gender Equity Hearings, supra note 130 at 200-07 (statement of Charles
M. Neinas, Executive Director, College Football Association). None of the studies or data cited
can accurately measure how men's and women's interest levels would compare if they were
provided with equal opportunities to participate in athletics.
148. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, The Debate on Diversity in California Shifts, N.Y. TIES, June
4, 1995, at Al; Holly Idelson, Pressure Builds for Retreat on Affirmative Action, 1995 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1578, 1578 (1995).
149. Gender and Athletics Act, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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with "quotas"."'
a. The Misplaced Focus on Substantial Proportionality. The emphasis
on the substantial proportionality test is not borne out by the facts. In actu-
ality, all three parts of the test count equally both in the courts and in
DOE's OCR enforcement actions. 51 Every single court decision to address
the equal accommodation of athletic interest and ability has equally applied
all three parts of the Policy Interpretation's three-part test.5 2 Universities
have lost these cases not because the courts have only looked at propor-
tionality, but because they have failed to prevail on any one of the three
parts of the test. DOE's OCR also looks at all three parts of the test, as is
demonstrated by the fact that some universities have been found in compli-
ance under prongs two and three even when they do not meet proportion-
ality. 53
A variation on the Title IX opponents' emphasis on proportionality as
the primary measure of compliance is the assertion that, regardless of wheth-
er DOE's OCR and the courts currently apply all three prongs of the test,
institutions which choose to comply with prongs two or three will eventual-
ly be forced to reach proportionality."s This would occur, the argument
continues, because prongs two and three require an institution to continually
add programs to keep pace .with women's athletic interest. Only when a
school reaches proportionality will it be free from its obligation to add new
women's opportunities. However, if the underlying assumption of this argu-
ment is true - that women's interest will continue to outpace existing oppor-
tunities - it is difficult to see how the three-part test works an injustice be-
cause the very intent of Title IX wag to open up opportunities for women as
their interest increased.
150. See, e.g., Gender Equity Hearings, supra note 130 at 151 (statement of T.J. Kerr, Presi-
dent of the National Wrestling Coaches Association) (mistakenly stating that DOE's OCR em-
phasizes proportionality and that the proportionality rule is a "gender quota"); Craig L. Hym-
owitz, Losers on the Level Playing Field: How Men's Sports Got Sacked By Quotas, Bureaucrats and
Title IX, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1995, at 5 (Outlook); Lederman, supra note 140 at A65 (quoting
a lawyer representing Brown University as calling the DOE's OCR's new policy guidance "an
effort to 'strengthen the quota system' imposed by the courts in the Brown case.").
151. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994); Roberts,
998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen Il, 879 F. Supp.
185 (D.R.I. 1995); Favia v. Indiana Univ., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Gender Equity
Hearings, supra note 130 at 40 (statement of Secretary Cantu) (explaining that OCR applies all
three prongs of the test equally).
152. See sources cited supra note 149.
153. See, e.g., Tom Witosky, Legal Action Possible Against ISU, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 14,
1995, at 4S (discussing OCR ruling that Iowa State University complied with Title IX based
on "its historic effort and commitment to meeting the interest expressed by women for athlet-
ic programs" despite the lack of substantially proportionate athletic opportunities for women
compared to women's enrollment); see also Gender Equity Hearings, supra note 130 at 38, 40
(statement of Secretary Cantu) (stating that OCR applies all three prongs of the three-part test
equally).
154. See generally Jeffrey H. Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for
Women, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 129 (1996) (discussing how institutions will eventually
reach proportionality under Title IX).
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At the heart of this argument is the belief that once a university has
complied with prong two or three of the test, it should not have to make
any additional changes in its athletic offerings to ensure that it stays in com-
pliance. Such a result is neither possible nor desirable. A static test for com-
pliance would fail to capture the core of Title IX - that men and women
deserve equal athletic opportunity. The meaning of equal athletic opportunity
for any given institution depends on the changing circumstances at that
institution. It would hardly be equitable if a school were allowed to main-
tain compliance with Title IX simply because it had complied with prong
two earlier by adding women's teams, but then subsequently halted expan-
sion of women's opportunities despite growing interest among women to
play sports. Indeed, the prong two standard, which permits an institution to
come into compliance merely by making progress toward equalization of
women's opportunities, is unusually lenient among civil rights laws. Similar-
ly, if an institution fully accommodated women's athletic interest ten years
ago under prong three, this fact alone should not render an institution in
compliance if women currently have unmet athletic interests and receive
disproportionately fewer athletic opportunities. Even compliance with prong
one is not static, as enrollment may fluctuate or athletic offerings may
change, requiring institutions who choose to comply under prong one to
accommodate those changes in order to stay in compliance.
Rather than providing any valid reasons for altering the three-part test,
the argument that prongs two and three ultimately will require proportional-
ity is simply another effort to make proportionality, and by extension quotas,
the focus of the debate.
b. The Misuse of the "Quota" Label. Even if substantially propor-
tionate participation rates were the single or primary measure of compliance,
the quota label would still be inappropriate. The argument that requiring
substantially proportionate participation rates establishes a quota system
which grants preferential treatment to women has been heavily relied upon
by Title IX opponents without regard to its inapplicability to intercollegiate
athletics. Advocates of this position have relied on analogies to other educa-
tional benefits to attack the use of proportionality in athletics. They argue
that the use of proportionality as a measure of equity in intercollegiate ath-
letics is tantamount to invoking quotas requiring a particular racial or gen-
der balance in academic departments, band, or other academic or extracurric-
ular activities."55 This argument obscures the fundamental reality that com-
petitive athletics stands alone as virtually the only educational program or
activity covered by Title IX which offers separate opportunities on the basis
of sex.'56
155. See, e.g., Gender Equity Hearings, supra note 130 at 14-17 (testimony of Rep. Hastert);
Amicus Curiae Brief for Baylor Univ. et al. at 28, Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995);
appeal docketed, No. 95-2205 (1st Cir. Nov. 6, 1995) (mistakenly stating that Title IX's substan-
tial proportionality test in athletics would "presumably" apply to college course and seminars
with limited enrollment).
156. See Kelley v. University of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Congress itself recog-
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Virtually all intercollegiate athletic programs sponsor sex-segregated
teams. Unlike in employment, where men and women compete against one
another for the same jobs, male and female college athletes compete sepa-
rately for slots on male and female teams. While there are no inherent limits
on the percentage of women or men who may fill the jobs available in a
particular workplace, the nature of intercollegiate athletics itself sets gender-
based limits on the percentage of men and the percentage of women who
may participate in the program. Because intercollegiate athletic programs
offer sex-separate teams, the selection of teams, hiring of coaches, budgeting,
and recruiting together set a quota by determining the percentage of male
and female athletes who will be allowed to participate in the program."7
Consequently, while the use of the word quota to describe the substantially
proportionate participation rate measure in intercollegiate athletics makes for
provocative rhetoric, it is not accurate because the university itself sets a
quota for the percentage of males and females who may participate in inter-
collegiate athletics. The relevant question is not whether there should be a
gender-based quota in intercollegiate athletics, but whether universities
should continue to reserve 67% of their varsity athletic slots for men and
only 33% for women, or whether it should more closely parallel the percent-
ages of men and women attending the university.
c. The Relative Interest Argument. The implicit assumption underly-
ing the quota or reverse discrimination argument is that the three-part test is
unfair to men because it assumes that men and women are equally inter-
ested in sports. If it can be shown that men are more interested in playing
sports than women, the argument continues, then the three-part test actually
discriminates against men. This argument has repeatedly surfaced in the
Cohen litigation, where Brown has attempted to use surveys to show that its
provision of fewer athletic opportunities for women reflects women's lesser
interest in sports, so thatincreasing women's share of opportunities would
discriminate against men.'58 In the argument advanced by Brown, if 500
men and 250 women are interested and able to play sports, the university
should only have to accommodate both genders in proportion to their re-
spective interest. Under this scenario, offering 100 slots for men to play
sports and 50 to women would comply with Title IX.159
nized that addressing discrimination in athletics presented a unique set of problems not raised
in areas such as employment and academics."). The Title IX regulations specifically permit sex
separate athletic teams where team selection is based on competitive skill or where contact
sports are involved. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1995). The only other sex-separate educational pro-
grams or activities contemplatpd by Title IX are participation in contact sports during physical
education, sex education at the elementary and secondary level, and choirs. Id.
157. See Cohen IIl, 879 F. Supp. 185, 202-03 (D.R.I. 1995) (recognizing that Brown "predeter-
mines" the gender balance of its intercollegiate athletics program through the selection of
sports, recruiting of athletes, hiring of coaches with preferences for team sizes, budgeting of
teams, and use of admissions preferences for athletes).
158. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen Il1, 879 F. Supp. at 185.
159. This analogy was explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899.
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The rejection of this argument by the courts in Cohen, both by the First
Circuit during the preliminary injunction stage of the litigation 1W and by
the district court during the trial on the merits, 6' demonstrates a number
of its failings. First, and most significantly, there is no conceivable measure
of interest that fully accounts for the fact that women have had, and con-
tinue to have, significantly fewer opportunities to participate in interscholas-
tic and intercollegiate sports in this country. As the First Circuit observed in
Cohen:
Given that the survey of interests and abilities would begin under
circumstances where men's athletic teams have a considerable head
start, such a rule would almost certainly blunt the exhortation that
schools should 'take into account the nationally increasing levels of
women's interests and abilities' and avoid 'disadvantag[ing] mem-
bers of an underrepresented sex ..... ,""
Any measure that purports to compare the interest of women and men
in participating in sports will be affected by the present mix of opportunities
for men and women. For example, the answers given by high school stu-
dents to questions about what college sports they want to participate in will
inevitably be affected by what sports they have had a chance to play in high
school. These answers, in turn, will have been influenced by their opportuni-
ties for college athletic scholarships and the mix of sports offered at the
college level.
No survey population avoids this problem. For example, as the district
court recognized in Cohen, any survey of the student body will be driven by
the university's athletic offerings, recruiting practices, admissions preferences,
and athletic scholarships, if available. Particularly at Division I schools that
rely on recruiting to select their intercollegiate athletes, the results of a sur-
vey of athletic interest in the student body is predetermined by the univer-
sity's selection of sports and recruiting practices. For example, if a university
recruits twice as many men as women for its intercollegiate athletic offer-
ings, a survey which finds more men than women who claim to be interest-
ed in participating in intercollegiate athletes is not a true measure of relative
interest. Similarly, a survey of student applicants to a university will be
skewed by that university's existing opportunities. Students who want to
participate in a sport not offered at a particular university may not apply
there."
The largest potential survey pool, all high school graduates qualified for
admission to a university, is also inadequate as a survey population. In
addition to the difficulties involved in identifying and surveying such a
potentially large population, this grouping does not escape problems inher-
ent in the use of such surveys as an objective measure of interest. Because
160. Id. at 888.
161. Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 185.
162. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 900 (quoting 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,417 (1979)).
163. Cohen III, 879 F. Supp. at 206.
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opportunities for girls in interscholastic athletics continue to be limited at the
high school level, a comparative survey of the relative athletic interest in this
pool by gender will reflect the disparity in opportunities provided at both
the high school and college level. In a world where men receive nearly twice
as many college athletic scholarships as women, the incentive for sports
participation at the high school and college levels cannot be considered
equal.' Adopting a relative interest standard, which cannot take into ac-
count the discriminatory differences in athletic opportunities provided to
men and women, will only solidify existing inequities in opportunity.
In addition to the insurmountable problems of identifying an appropn-
ate survey population, no objective and reliable measure of interest exists to
quantify an individual's actual interest in participating in intercollegiate
athletics.1" Survey questions cannot accurately determine whether a *person
who reports to have interest in a particular sport would actually participate
in intercollegiate athletics if given the opportunity, nor can surveys differen-
tiate between interest in participating in intramural, club, or intercollegiate
athletic programs.'" Even if a survey specifically asked respondents to dif-
ferentiate between interest in varsity and other levels of sports competition,
the results would not be reliable indicators of who would actually partici-
pate at each level. Moreover, interest surveys cannot account for gender
differences in reporting degrees of interest, such as men being more likely to
report milder interest in athletics, and women more likely to report only
serious interest.'" Persons who report no interest in participating in inter-
collegiate athletics may well decide to participate in a sport, when given the
opportunity, particularly if athletic 'scholarships are available.
As a practical matter, requiring student-plaintiffs to first assess relative
athletic interest among men and women in some survey population before
bringing a Title IX claim would create an unworkable standard.'69 Apply-
ing this requirement, student-plaintiffs would have to first assess the relative
interest between men and women on their campus before filing a Title IX
complaint. The existing three-part test, on the other hand, enables student-
plaintiffs to rely on outwardly visible indicia of unmet interest, such as a
successful women's club program, to demonstrate unmet interest under the
164. See Debra E. Blum, Slow Progress on Equity: Survey of Division I Colleges Show Little Has
Changed for Female Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 26, 1994, at A45 (re-
porting results of a survey finding that women receive only 35.7% of the money spent on
athletic scholarships).
165. The district court in Cohen III recognized the lack of such a measure. Cohen III, 879 F.
Supp. at 205 n.43.
166. Id. at 206 n.45 (noting that Brown's survey could not differentiate between interest in
varsity athletics, as opposed to club, intramural, and recreational sports).
167. Id. at 205 n.43 (noting that Brown's expert on interest surveys acknowledged "that
there is no single factor by which to measure th[e] degree of athletic interest that will reliably
be acted upon when the opportunity is present.").
168. See id. at 206 n.46 (citing acknowledgment by Brown's expert that only a small minor-
ity of those indicating an interest in varsity sports will actually participate given the opportu-
nity, and that differences in the seriousness of interest reported by men and women can
result in major shifts in female/male interest ratios).
169. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888, 900 (1st. Cir. 1993) (recognizing quantification problems
such a standard would present for student-plaintiffs and universities monitoring self-compli-
ance).
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third prong without conducting a campus-wide relative interest survey. Stu-
dents will typically be unable to afford the cost of such surveys and analy-
sis, and may have difficulty finding legal representation that will pay the
costs of expert witnesses required to assess relative interest."7°
The argument that relative interests of men and women in sports can
be accurately measured independent of disparities in existing opportunities is
also contrary to the intent and purposes underlying Title IX, as well as past
experience. Congress enacted Title IX against a backdrop of overwhelming
evidence of sex discrimination in education. 1' Shortly after Title IX was
enacted, intercollegiate athletics became a focal point in congressional de-
bates over Title IX. Congressional debates on the Title IX regulations in 1975
focused on the athletics regulations and recognized persistent and wide-
spread discrimination against women in intercollegiate athletics." In docu-
menting this discrimination, Congress recognized that women's athletic inter-
est and ability had been, and was being, suppressed by their limited oppor-
tunities. For example, as Senator Birch Bayh, the primary Senate sponsor of
Title IX, observed that, ". .. [ilnasmuch as we are trying to compensate for
generations of stereotype[s], I think it is going to take us some time before
women really are going to be able to develop full potential of their
skills."" 3 Again, when Congress undertook to reverse the Supreme Court's
decision in Grove City, the congressional debate reflected a remarkable con-
sensus in recognizing sex discrimination in intercollegiate athletics as a seri-
ous problem.74
Similarly, the Policy Interpretation, which was the product of an exten-
sive notice and comment period during which the agency received over
170. Hiring an expert to assess relative interest on campus can be extremely costly. Brown
University, for example, reportedly spent over $100,000 on surveys attempting to assess men's
and women's relative athletic interest at Brown. Richard Sandomir, Brown is Told Sports Pro-
gram Cheats Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at B13. Because expert fees are excluded from
attorney's fees and costs recoverable from a losing defendant, very few, if any, plaintiffs'
attorneys would be willing to undertake such an expense. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) (refusing to award plaintiffs the costs of expert witness fees
as part of recoverable costs and fees in civil rights cases).
171. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,423 (1979) ("[tlhe legislative history of Title IX clearly
shows that it was enacted because of discrimination that currently was being practiced against
women in educational institutions."); 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Birch Bayh
describing Title IX as "a strong and comprehensive measure [that would] provide women
with solid legal protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving to
perpetuate second-class citizenship for American women.").
172. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 21 at 165 (testimony of Rep. Patsy Mink) (N[s]uch an
exemption [of intercollegiate athletic programs from Title IX] would permit sports programs to
continue to discriminate against women"); id. at 175 (testimony of Sen. Birch Bayh) ("no one
making the argument that athletics should not be covered under Title IX does so on the
premise that there is no discrimination"); id. at 197 (testimony of Rep. Stewart McKinney)
(recognizing that in 1975, the women's total intercollegiate athletic budget was only 2% of the
men's total).
173. Id. at 179.
174. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that "the record of the floor
debate leaves little doubt that the enactment was aimed, in part, at creating a more level
playing field for female athletes.").
For a discussion of the Grove City decision and subsequent legislative action, see supra
Part l(B)(4)(a) and (b).
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10,000 comments, also recognizes the link between interest and opportunity,
stating that "[plarticipation in intercollegiate sports has historically been
emphasized for men but not women. Partially as a consequence of this,
participation rates of women are far below those of men."75 Limiting wo-
men's athletic opportunities to their present levels based on some measure of
the current relative interest between men and women, where women's inter-
est continues to be suppressed by limited opportunities, would contravene
this recognition.
Women have experienced and continue to experience discrimination in
all of the elements of intercollegiate athletic programs that develop interest
and ability - recruitment among high school athletes, scholarships, prestige,
operational support, publicity, and the opportunity to participate in a com-
petitive program. Consequently, without a level playing field, any measure
purporting to compare men's and women's interest in intercollegiate athletics
will simply reinforce the existing disparity in opportunities.
History has proven that athletic interest and ability expand as new
opportunities are created. The refrain from the movie FIELD OF DREAMS' 76
could well describe the history of women's athletics in this country - if you
build it, they will come. As schools began to create women's athletic pro-
grams in response to Title IX, participation by female students in organized
sports soared, increasing by 600% at the high school level between 1971 and
1978."r Women's athletic participation at the college level also sustained
huge increases as Title IX created new athletic opportunities for women. In
1971, prior to the enactment of Title IX, less than 32,000 women played var-
sity sports at the college level. 7 In 1993-94, over 105,000 college women
competed in NCAA sports." Women's interest in participating in sports
has always kept pace with expansions in women's athletic opportunities.
d. Reverse Discrimination Claims in the Courts. Every court to date
that has considered reverse discrimination claims challenging the three-part
test has rejected these claims."s Such claims have been brought by male
athletes where, for budgetary reasons, universities have sought to downsize
their athletic programs but have been unable to cut women's teams without
175. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,419 (1979). The Policy Interpretation also documents extensive
discrimination against women in intercollegiate athletics, noting that "disproportionately more
financial aid has been made available for male athletes than for female athletes .... Like-
wise, substantial amounts have been provided for the recruitment of male athletes, but little
funding has been made available for the recruitment of female athletes." Id.
176. FIELD OF DREAMs (Universal Studios, 1989).
177. See id. During this same time period, women's participation in varsity athletics at the
college level increased 102%.
178. Id.
179. NCAA News Release, supra note 2.
180. See Kelley v. University of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Roberts I, 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir. 1993); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995). At least one such
challenge was settled out of court without any court decision in the case. See Caruso v.
Broyles, No. 93-5089 (W.D. Ark. filed May 27, 1993). In Caruso, male swimmers sued the
University of Arkansas for dropping the men's swimming team. The University quickly settled
the case by reinstating the team. Id.
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bringing themselves further out of compliance with Title IX.' Such claims
have also arisen where universities, in defending against Title IX suits by
female athletes brought under the three-part test, have challenged the three-
part test as sanctioning reverse discrimination against male athletes.' 2 In
both contexts, the reverse discrimination claims have alleged violations of the
rights of male students under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 Where an institution provides male stu-
dents with a disproportionately greater share of athletic opportunities than
female students, neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection Clause will support
a claim that dropping a men's team or adding a women's team constitutes
unlawful discrimination against men.
i. Reverse discrimination claims under Title IX. Claims by male
athletes challenging the elimination of a men's sport under Title IX are sub-
ject to the same three-part test that courts have applied to Title IX claims by
female athletes. However, because the three-part test focuses on the opportu-
nities provided to the underrepresented sex, at most institutions discrimina-
tion claims brought by male athletes will not succeed under Title IX. For
example, male athletes who sue their university for dropping a men's sport
will not be able to carry their burden of proof on the first prong if the ath-
letic opportunities allocated to men overall are not substantially fewer than
men's share of enrollment. Because a school need only comply with one of
three parts of the test to comply with Title IX, reverse discrimination claims
will fail under prong one of the test where men are not the
underrepresented sex, without regard to prongs two or three.
Court decisions have applied this analysis in rejecting Title IX challeng-
es brought by male athletes to university decisions eliminating men's teams.
For example, in Kelley v. University of Illinois,'" male swimmers challenged
the University's decision to eliminate varsity men's swimming, while retain-
ing the varsity women's swimming program, under both Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision had
been motivated, in part, by the University's $600,000 deficit in its athletic
budget. Men's swimming was selected for termination specifically because it
was a historically weak program, was not widely offered at high schools,
and did not have a large spectator following. Because the University recog-
nized that dropping a women's sport would place it at risk of violating Title
IX given the disproportionately fewer athletic opportunities available to
women at the University, it chose not to eliminate women's swimming."a
181. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 265; Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1000; Caruso, No. 93-5089.
182. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 824; Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888, 890 (1st. Cir. 1993).
183. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
184. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
185. Had the University eliminated women's swimming, it would have been out of com-
pliance with Title IX under the three-part test. Id. at 269. In 1993, female students comprised
44% of the undergraduate enrollment, but only 23.4% of varsity athletes at the University. In
addition, dropping women's swimming would have put the school out of compliance with
prong three, as the University would not be fully and effectively accommodating the athletic
interests of the underrepresented sex. Finally, although no court has explicitly ruled on this
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In applying the three-part test to the plaintiffs' Title IX claim, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the male swimmer's rights were not violated because men
were not the underrepresented sex, and therefore could not succeed on
prong one of the test.
Similar reasoning was applied to reject a Title IX claim by male athletes
in Gonyo v. Drake University."8 In Gonyo, male wrestlers challenged their
University's decision to discontinue its men's varsity wrestling team on both
Title IX and equal protection grounds.187 Drake had dropped its men's
wrestling program as part of a plan to reduce its athletic budget. Like the
University of Illinois, Drake's decision to drop the men's sport was made in
the context of an athletic program that provided substantially more athletic
opportunities for men than women. Men were 42.8% of the student body at
Drake, yet received 75.3% of the total varsity athletic slots at the Universi-
ty."8 In granting summary judgment against the plaintiffs, the court ruled
that Drake's elimination of a men's team did not establish a Title IX viola-
tion because men were significantly overrepresented in the total athletic
program.'89
The courts' rejection of Title IX claims by male athletes challenging the
elimination of a particular men's sport where men remain overrepresented in
the overall athletics program properly reflects Title IX's focus on the rights
of men and women as athletes, rather than as members of particular
teams."9 This balance reflects the policy determination that an overall pro-
gram comparison is a superior and more flexible test than requiring team-
by-team equivalence - a standard which would require the men's and wo-
men's athletic programs to mirror one another. A team-by-team approach
would frequently disadvantage women because the greater opportunities and
benefits provided to men who play football would have no counterpart in
the women's athletics. Moreover, men and women may have differing levels
of interest in particular sports, and a team-by-team comparison may not
properly reflect those different interests."' For example, at a particular in-
question, dropping women's swimming in itself probably would have placed the University in
violation of prong two because the elimination of a women's team, despite continuing interest
in the program, would be inconsistent with a history of continuing program expansion for the
underrepresented sex. As the Seventh Circuit observed, the University's decision not to cut
women's swimming was "extremely prudent." Id.
186. 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
187. Id. at 1001.
188. Id. at 1002.
189. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' Title IX challenge to the University's allocation
of a greater share of athletic financial assistance to female than male athletes. Men at Drake
were 75.3% of varsity athletes, but received 47% of athletic scholarships. Id. at 1002. The court
ruled that the scholarship disparity did not violate the Title IX regulations, which require rea-
sonable opportunities for the awarding of athletic scholarships for each gender in proportion
to their athletic participation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (1995). Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1005. In reject-
ing this claim, the court ruled that the scholarship regulation "was never intended to prevent
schools from allocating resources in a way designed to encourage participation by an under-
represented gender." Id.
190. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,422 (1979) (observing that the Title IX regulation requires
equal opportunity between men and women on a program-wide basis, and that "Title IX
protects the individual as a student-athlete, not as a basketball player, or swimmer.").
191. See Kelley v. University of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that it
was not unreasonable for HEW to reject a team-by-team comparison as "a rigid approach that
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stitution, women may have more interest in playing volleyball than soccer,
while men may prefer soccer to volleyball. Rather than requiring that institu-
tion to offer the same sport to both groups, the current standard permits the
school to offer volleyball to women and soccer to men, while treating both
sets of athletes comparably. Consequently, male athletes challenging their
university's decision to drop their sport under Title IX will not succeed
where the opportunities provided to male athletes overall are under-
representative.
Courts have also rejected reverse discrimination arguments by universi-
ties challenging the three-part test itself as a violation of Title IX in defend-
ing against Title IX suits by female athletes. In defending such cases, uni-
versities have argued that courts should reject the DOE's three-part test as a
valid interpretation of Title IX because it violates § 1681(b) of the Act. Sec-
tion 1681(b) provides that:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be inter-
preted to require any education institution to grant preferential or
disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the
benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in compari-
son with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in
any community, State, section, or other area. Provided, That this
subsection shall not be construed to prevent the consideration in
any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence
tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the
participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or
activity by the members of one sex.1"
Both Brown University and Colorado State University argued that the three-
part test mandates statistical balancing in violation of this provision. But
both the First and Tenth Circuits rejected this argument on the ground that
the three-part test provides three independent avenues for Title IX compli-
ance and does not mandate proportionality.193
In addition to the reasoning of the First and Tenth Circuits, the argu-
ment that the three-part test constitutes preferential treatment in violation of
§ 1681(b) should be rejected for another reason. This section was designed to
prohibit quotas in university admissions and hiring,"9 and does not apply
to the use of substantial proportionality as a measure of equity in the con-
denies schools the flexibility to respond to the differing athletic interests of men and wom-
en.").
192. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994).
193. See Roberts I, 998 F.2d 824, 829 nn. 5-6 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen II, 991 F.2d 888, 895
(1st Cir. 1993); see also Kelley v. University of Ill., 35,F.3d at 271 (rejecting plaintiffs' argu-
ment that the three-part test establishes a gender-based quota system contrary to the man-
dates of Title IX, although not specifically addressing § 1681(b)).
194. HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2608, 2671; see also 117 CONG. REC. 39,261-62 (remarks of Rep. Albert H. Quie (R-Minn.).
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text of intercollegiate athletics, which by virtue of offering sex-separate teams
itself requires a particular gender ratio of participants. 95 An institution
which provides intercollegiate athletic opportunities for each gender in num-
bers substantially proportionate to enrollment is not granting preferential or
disparate treatment to the members of either sex, as prohibited under
§ 1681(b). Because intercollegiate athletics is a sex-segregated activity, gender
is already a requirement for participation on an athletic team. Rather than
requiring preferential or disparate treatment based on gender, requiring the
offering of substantially proportionate opportunities in this context is a mea-
sure of equal treatment and nondiscrimination.
ii. Reverse discrimination claims under the Equal Protection
Clause.196  Claims that Title IX's three-part test requires reverse discrimi-
nation against male athletes are also unsupported by the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. Both male plaintiffs alleging that a
university decision to discontinue their team violates equal protection,
197
and institutions claiming in defense of Title IX suits that the application of
the three-part test discriminates against men, have raised such claims.1
98
Neither challenge is consistent with equal protection principles, and courts
have rejected such claims in both contexts.
In equal protection challenges by male athletes whose teams have been
eliminated, courts have ruled that the application of Title IX to a university
program which results in the elimination of a men's team, with no corre-
sponding elimination of a women's team, does not violate equal protection.
For example, in Kelley, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld
the three-part test as applied to the University based on Congress' broad
powers to remedy past discrimination.' The court concluded that, to the
extent that the three-part test requires a school to consider gender in reduc-
ing its athletic offerings, such consideration of gender is substantially related
to the important government interest of remedying sex discrimination in in-
tercollegiate athletics and therefore complies with equal protection.2' Simi-
larly, the court in Gonyo rejected the equal protection claim of the male wre-
stlers, holding that the consideration of gender in decreasing athletic pro-
grams complies with equal protection because it properly assists members of
the underrepresented sex, as is permissible under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.2"'
Institutions defending Title IX claims have also failed to establish that
the three-part test violates equal protection."2 In Cohen, Brown argued that
195. See Cohen I1, 879 F. Supp. at 202 (crediting testimony of plaintiffs' expert that "a
university 'predetermines' the approximate number of athletic participants and the male to
female ratio" through its athletic offerings).
196. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
197. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 265; Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
198. See Cohen 11, 991 F.2d at 900.
199. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272 (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 565-66
(1990)).
200. Id.
201. 458 U.S. 718 (1982); see also Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1006.
202. See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900.
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by requiring the full and effective accommodation of the athletic interests of
the underrepresented sex, without regard to whether the institution is fully
accommodating the interests of overrepresented sex, the three-part test ac-
cords preferential treatment to women in violation of equal protection.0 3
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected this argument for two
reasons. First, the court rejected Brown's view of the three-part test as con-
ferring preferential treatment. The court observed that Brown's characteriza-
tion of the test as preferential treatment assumes that, given equal opportu-
nity, women are less interested in participating in varsity sports than
men.2' The court explicitly rejected this assumption. Second, the court held
that even if the test did constitute a gender preference, it would still pass
constitutional muster because it fits within Congress' design to remedy ex-
tensive discrimination against women in intercollegiate sports.' 5 Like the
courts in Kelley and Gonyo, the First Circuit relied on Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC2°6 in support of its deference to Congress' broad powers to remedy
past discrimination.0 7
Both rationales relied on by courts in rejecting reverse discrimination
challenges to the propriety of the elimination of men's teams and to the
three-part test are justified under equal protection principles. First, neither
the three-part test nor its application to a university's decision to reduce its
athletic offerings constitutes a gender-based classification which disadvantag-
es men as a group under the Equal Protection Clause. In the world of inter-
collegiate athletics, a decision to drop a team will always have a gender-
based component because of the existence of sex-separate teams. Because
reverse discrimination claimants do not challenge the sex-based classification
of separate men's and women's athletic teams, 2 8 their challenge rests on
the characterization of a decision to drop a men's team as a gender-based
classification that disadvantages men.2' However, dropping a men's athlet-
ic team is not a gender-based classification that disadvantages men when
men continue to retain the lion's share of athletic opportunities. Rather, such
a decision is a gender-based classification that lessens the existing gender-
based preference in favor of men, and therefore does not discriminate
against men under the Equal Protection Clause.
Second, even if the three-part test or its application to athletic cutbacks
was viewed as a gender-based classification that disadvantages men for
equal protection purposes, it would still be constitutionally permissible be-
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 901.
206. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
207. Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 901.
208. See Kelley v. University of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1994); Gonyo v. Drake
Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (S.D. Iowa 1995). Moreover, the provision of sex-separate inter-
collegiate athletic teams would easily survive such a challenge as it is directly related to en-
suring that women have a meaningful opportunity to compete in intercollegiate athletics. Mis-
sissippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (gender-based classifications may
be upheld where justified by a compensatory purpose).
209. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (requiring gender-based classifications which disadvantage me-
mbers of one sex to be substantially related to an important government interest to pass
constitutional muster).
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cause it is designed to remedy past discrimination against women in inter-
collegiate sports."' Courts rejecting reverse discrimination claims on this
ground have relied in part on Congress' broad powers to remedy discrimi-
nation upheld under Metro Broadcasting.1 This past term, in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pefia,"2 the Supreme Court overruled its holding in Metro
Broadcasting that Congress is entitled to greater deference than state and local
governments in enacting race-based affirmative remedial measures. However,
the Court's recent decision in Adarand should not change the result in re-
verse discrimination challenges to the three-part test or its applications.
As an initial matter, Adarand should have no effect on the analysis of
gender-based classifications designed to remedy discrimination against wom-
en. In Adarand, the Court applied strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative
remedial measures enacted by Congress, which is the standard used by
courts to evaluate racial discrimination. As long as gender-based classifica-
tions which discriminate against women are subjected to a lesser standard of
intermediate scrutiny, it would defy common sense to apply strict scrutiny
to gender-based classifications designed to remedy discrimination against
women.
21 3
Moreover, even if strict scrutiny were extended to gender-based discrim-
ination against women,214 the use of gender as a factor in determining how
to decrease athletic offerings in an athletics program that provides more
offerings to men should easily survive even strict scrutiny. Analyzed under
strict scrutiny, a gender-based classification would be permissible if it was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.215 Remedying
ongoing discrimination against women in an athletics program is undoubt-
edly a compelling state interest.21 6 Unlike the race-based affirmative action
plan in Croson, which did not survive strict scrutiny because it was premised
210. Id. at 728 ("A gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it inten-
tionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened.").
211. 497 U.S. at 565-66.
212. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
213. Despite the lack of a legal basis for applying strict scrutiny to gender-based affirma-
tive action programs, however, some courts have arguably incorrectly extended the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), which applied
strict scrutiny to municipal race-based affirmative action plans, to gender-based affirmative
action plans as well. See Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1190 (1994); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989); Cone Corp. v. Hills-
borough County, 723 F. Supp. 669 (M.D. Fla. 1989). But see, Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc.
v. City & County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 941 (9th Cir. 1987) (refusing to interpret
Croson as requiring strict, rather than intermediate scrutiny, in evaluating gender-based affir-
mative action plan).
214. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 n.6 (1994) (finding it unnecessary to de-
cide whether gender-based classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny); Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 373
(1993).
215. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) ("When race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the
'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases.").
216. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (state interest in remedy-
ing past discriminatory conduct was sufficiently compelling).
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on correcting general societal discrimination rather than discrimination in the
affected industry,"7 the use of gender in this context directly addresses the
discrimination by the affected institution itself.
The use of gender in cutting athletic offerings which are already slanted
toward men is also narrowly tailored toward furthering the compelling state
interest in remedying the school's discrimination against women athletes.
Because intercollegiate athletics, unlike the construction industry involved in
Croson, provide sex-segregated opportunities, gender is a necessary compo-
nent of any plan to redress discrimination in the allocation of athletic oppor-
tunities between men and women."' Indeed, where an institution has de-
cided to reduce athletic offerings in a program that provides more oppor-
tunities to men, the fit between the use of a gender-based classification to
reduce men's rather than women's opportunities, and the goal of remedying
ongoing institutional discrimination against women, could not be closer.
Despite widespread allegations of reverse discrimination by opponents
of Title IX's three-part test for compliance, such claims are not supported by
legal principles. The frustration and hardship experienced by male athletes
who have lost their sports in budget cuts that have not similarly eliminated
women's teams is entirely understandable, but so is the frustration and hard-
ship suffered by female athletes who have never had the opportunities af-
forded their male counterparts. Cuts in men's programs do not amount to
reverse discrimination when men retain the lion's share of athletic opportu-
nities. While allegations of reverse discrimination are to be expected in an
environment of program cutbacks, especially if the university making the
cuts blames gender equity as the culprit behind such eliminations, such
claims and allegations are both legally and factually untenable.
2. Football is Unique: The Third Sex Rationale. Another argument ad-
vanced by Title IX opponents to weaken the standards that have been ap-
plied by the DOE and the courts is that the three-part test does not take into
account the unique particularities of the sport of football.2 9 Because the av-
erage football squad has between 85 and 100 players, football's large num-
bers are blamed for the failure of many schools to satisfy the substantial
proportionality prong of Title IX compliance."0 In addition, football propo-
217. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499-504 (striking down a municipal set-aside program requir-
ing contractors to award 30% of the dollar amount of city contracts to minority-owned busi-
nesses because it found that the City Council had failed to make specific findings of race
discrimination in the local construction industry).
218. Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (finding race-based plan not narrowly tailored to ending
discrimination where race-neutral alternatives were not considered).
219. See Letter from Charles M. Neinas, Executive Director, College Football Association, to
Cedric W. Dempsey, Executive Director, National Collegiate Athletic Association (Oct. 10,
1994) (arguing that OCR has not taken into account the unique size and cost of football in
interpreting the Title IX regulations) (on file with the National Women's Law Center); Football
Coaches Take Aim at Title IX, USA TODAY (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 12, 1995, at C4.
220. Football Coaches Take Aim at Title IX, supra note 219, at C4 (arguing that meeting pro-
portionality would jeopardize football); see also Scorecard: The Third Sex, supra note 132, at 15
(noting efforts by football lobby to use large size of football squads to argue for exemption of
football from Title IX).
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nents claim that football's ability to generate revenue, coupled with the size
of the squads and the fact that it is a sport played only by men, justifies
taking football out of the mix in calculating whether substantially propor-
tionate opportunities are available to women."2
Neither the large size of football teams nor the fact that the sport is
played primarily by men justifies treating it differently than any other sport.
The large size of a football squad does not make football players a third
sex.' Institutions can offer an equivalent number of opportunities for
women to participate in athletics by offering several women's teams. Precise-
ly because football provides so many opportunities for men to play sports,
many institutions will have to offer more sports for women than men to
provide an equal opportunity for men and women to participate in athletics.
Moreover, while football is played primarily by men, there are a number of
sports now played primarily by women in this country, including volleyball,
field hockey, and synchronized swimming with which to counter such imbal-
ance. There is no shortage of sports for women to play to balance out the
opportunities provided to male athletes by football. Indeed, the three-part
test is sufficiently flexible to take into account the different sizes of sports
and different sports interests of men and women by evaluating equal oppor-
tunity on a program-wide basis, rather than on the basis of a team-by-team
comparison.'
Finally, the argument that football's revenue-producing capabilities justi-
fy an exemption from Title IX is also unpersuasive. In fact, the vast majority
of NCAA football programs lose more money than they bring in." Over
80% of football programs run a net deficit.' Even in Division I-A and I-
AA, the most competitive divisions which are beneficiaries of lucrative tele-
vision contracts, 62% of football programs on average have annual deficits of
$1 million in Division I-A and $664,000 in Division I-AA." 6 Moreover, it is
unclear why the capacity of an educational program to earn a profit should
entitle it to special treatment under Title IX. Congress rejected precisely such
a rationale in 1975 in defeating the Javits Amendment. 7
221. Football Coaches Take Aim at Title IX, supra note 219, at C4 (advocating the exemption
of football from the "proportionality" test); Knight, Football Coaches Put Title IX on Defensive,
supra note 129, at C4.
222. See Scorecard: The Third Sex, supra note 132, at 15 (criticizing efforts by the College
Football Association and the American Football Coaches Association to exempt football from
Title IX, and characterizing such efforts as treating football as a third sex).
223. See Kelley v. University of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 271 n.8 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving of
agency's rejection of team-by-team comparison as the measure of compliance, and noting that
such a standard -would either result in the elimination of football, or requiring schools to
provide a football program for women, regardless of whether women would prefer to partici-
pate in other sports).
224. Scorecard: The Third Sex, supra note 132, at 15.
225. Id.
226. DANIEL L. FULKS, REVENUES AND EXPENSEs OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS: FINAN-
CIAL TRENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS - 1993 at 4 (1994).
227. The substitute Javits Amendment required the regulating agency to take into account
the unique characteristics of individual sports in promulgating regulations. See supra notes
18-19 and accompanying text. Although the football associations are now arguing that the
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C. Behind the Backlash: the Continuing Bias Against Female Athletes
The intensity of the current backlash against Title IX enforcement, and
the tenacity with which institutions have defended against Title IX challeng-
es, indicate an entrenched and persistent resistance among some proponents
of the status quo to gender equity in athletics. The financial investments
institutions have made in fighting gender equity alone demonstrates their
commitment to the status quo. Colorado State University spent over $500,000
in attorney's fees in their unsuccessful defense of a lawsuit instead of re-
instating women's varsity softball at a fraction of the cost."2 Brown has
spent over $100,000 in expert witness fees alone seeking to prove that men
are inherently more interested in sports than women, independent of the
fewer sports opportunities available to women."
The grudging reluctance with which schools are only now, slowly and
over twenty years after the passage of Title IX, reallocating their priorities
and resources to provide women with more equitable opportunities reflects a
deeply imbedded view that sports participation for men is a right, while for
women it is a privilege. As one district court astutely recognized "[mlany
institutions of higher education apparently hold the opinion that providing
equality to women in athletics is both a luxury and a burden. The feeling
seems to be that to afford such equality to women is a gift and not a
right."' This view is so entrenched in our popular culture that its ex-
pression goes virtually unnoticed. For example, in reporting the victory of
the women student-athletes in the recent decision against Brown University,
the New York Times stated that the decision "could prompt new challenges
by women's programs at other Universities. More important, it could lead to
streamlining or outright elimination of some men's sports to bring support
for male and female athletic programs into proportion. " 2"u The assessment
of the New York Times of the relative importance of men's and women's
sport opportunities reflects a value judgment of which the reporter who
made it may not have been consciously aware. The consistently hostile reac-
tion to the progress of women in gaining increased athletic opportunities
reflects deeply held views of gender stereotypes - strong women athletes
don't fit with the image of women as vulnerable sex objects 2 . Only
Javits Amendment was never properly implemented because of football's unique size, as dis-
cussed above, this is not a legitimate reason for treating the sport differently. In fact, the
existing regulations recognize and account for the legitimate differences between football and
other sports by permitting institutions to spend more on football uniforms, equipment and
facilities as long as the money spent buys comparable quality for the men's and women's
athletic programs overall. Consequently, the regulations recognize that football uniforms will
cost more than swimsuits, and that money spent on a stadium and crowd control for football
games will exceed that spent for volleyball. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
228. Jennifer Gavin, State's Legal Costs Swell, DENY. PosT, Dec. 26, 1993, at IA.
229. Sandomir, supra note 131, at Al.
230. Cook v. Colgate, 802 F. Supp. 737, 750 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17
(2nd Cir. 1993).
231. Sandomir, supra note 131, at Al (emphasis added).
232. See generally, Mary Jo Kane Media Coverage of the Post Title IX Female Athlete: A
Feminist Analysis of Sports, Gender, and Power, 3 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 95 (1996) (arguing
that the media portrays female athletes in ways that enforce oppressive stereotypes).
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through continued exposure to female athletes will these stereotypes and the
hostility to the gains of women under Title IX give way to acceptance of
real equality for women in intercollegiate athletics.
III. CONCLUSION
In the past few years, women have made significant and long-awaited
progress in achieving an equal opportunity to participate in intercollegiate
athletics. Courts have unanimously adopted the DOE's three-part test for
compliance with Title IX. As a result, women have succeeded in obtaining
court orders requiring their schools to add additional women's teams and
preventing their schools from cutting teams. But because of these successes,
and a more conservative political environment in Congress, Title IX has
come under attack by proponents of college football and other men's sports
claiming that, as interpreted by the DOE and the courts, the law discrimi-
nates against men. Their argument is premised on the assertion that men are
more interested in sports than women, and therefore deserve
disproportionately more athletic opportunities. This assertion is unsupported
by the evidence and has been soundly rejected in the courts.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether arguments for weakening
Title IX will succeed in the new Congress. If history is any guide, propo-
nents of gender equity will ultimately prevail in maintaining strong legal
protections for women in intercollegiate athletics. It will not be an easy bat-
tle, however. The primary advocates of weakening Title IX, organizations
representing college football interests, have strong supporters in Congress,
and the continuing emphasis of society on the importance of sport opportu-
nities for men as opposed to women will only help their cause. In the final
round, the battle will depend on the political strength of female athletes and
their parents, a group that will not easily relinquish its hard-won progress
toward gender equity. Given the enormous health, confidence, and other
benefits female athletes obtain from sports competition,2 much more is at
stake than mere access to the playing field.
233. See, e.g., Carol Krucoff, Exercise and Breast Cancer, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 1995 (Health), at
16 (citing 1988 study finding that former college athletes had a 35% less chance of developing
breast cancer and a 61% less chance of developing reproductive cancer compared to non-ath-
letes); WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., MINORmES IN SPORTS: THE EFFEcr OF VARsrrY SPORTs PARTICIPATION
ON THE SOCIAL, EDUCATONAL, AND CAREER MOBILnY OF MINORIrY STuDEN'P 23-23 (1989) (document-
ing correlation between participation in high school athletics and higher self-esteem, higher
grades, higher standardized test scores and lower drop-out rates).
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